Security Thresholds of Multicarrier Continuous-Variable Quantum Key
  Distribution by Gyongyosi, Laszlo
 1
Equation Chapter 19 Section 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Security Thresholds of Multicarrier Continuous-Variable 
Quantum Key Distribution 
Laszlo Gyongyosi 
 
 
 
1 Quantum Technologies Laboratory, Department of Telecommunications 
Budapest University of Technology and Economics 
2 Magyar tudosok krt, Budapest, H-1117, Hungary 
2 MTA-BME Information Systems Research Group 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
7 Nador st., Budapest, H-1051, Hungary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
gyongyosi@hit.bme.hu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We prove the secret key rate formulas and derive security threshold parameters of multi-
carrier continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD). In a multicarrier 
CVQKD scenario, the Gaussian input quantum states of the legal parties are granulated 
into Gaussian subcarrier CVs (continuous-variables). The multicarrier communication 
formulates Gaussian sub-channels from the physical quantum channel, each dedicated to 
the transmission of a subcarrier CV. The Gaussian subcarriers are decoded by a unitary 
CV operation, which results in the recovered single-carrier Gaussian CVs. We derive the 
formulas through the AMQD (adaptive multicarrier quadrature division) scheme, the 
SVD-assisted (singular value decomposition) AMQD, and the multiuser AMQD-MQA 
(multiuser quadrature allocation). We prove that the multicarrier CVQKD leads to im-
proved secret key rates and higher tolerable excess noise in comparison to single-carrier 
CVQKD. We derive the private classical capacity of a Gaussian sub-channel and the secu-
rity parameters of an optimal Gaussian collective attack in the multicarrier setting. We 
reveal the secret key rate formulas for one-way and two-way multicarrier CVQKD proto-
cols, assuming homodyne and heterodyne measurements and direct and reverse reconcilia-
tion. The results reveal the physical boundaries of physically allowed Gaussian attacks in 
a multicarrier CVQKD scenario and confirm that the improved transmission rates lead to 
enhanced secret key rates and security thresholds. 
 
Keywords: quantum cryptography, continuous-variables, quantum Shannon theory 
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1  Introduction 
The continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) allows for legal parties to transmit 
information with unconditional security over the currently established telecommunication net-
works [1–20]. The CVQKD systems, in contrast to discrete variable (DV) QKD protocols, do not 
require single-photon sources and can be implemented by standard devices and modulation tech-
niques, allowing an efficient signal processing in practical scenarios. The CVQKD schemes in gen-
eral are based on Gaussian modulation, which is a well-applicable practical finding in the experi-
ment. In CVQKD, the information is carried via a Gaussian-modulated position and momentum 
quadratures in the phase space. The Gaussian quantum states (referred to as single-carriers 
throughout) are sent through a noisy quantum channel by the sender, Alice. The quantum chan-
nel is attacked by an eavesdropper (Eve), and the receiver (Bob) gets a noisy system. Since the 
optimal attack against CVQKD is a Gaussian attack [2–3, 17–19], the noise of the quantum 
channel can be provably modeled as an additive white Gaussian noise. The security of CVQKD 
has been already proven against several of the most powerful optimal Gaussian collective attacks, 
where the eavesdropper is allowed to use quantum memory and to perform a collective (joint) 
measurement on her quantum register at the end of the protocol run. 
Besides the attractive properties of CVQKD, in comparison with traditional telecommunica-
tion techniques [21–25], the efficiency of the protocol still requires several improvements, both in 
secret key rates and the maximum tolerable excess noise. In particular, with this in mind the mul-
ticarrier CVQKD has been recently introduced, and the AMQD (adaptive multicarrier quadra-
ture division) scheme has been defined [4]. Specifically, while in the standard CVQKD the infor-
mation is transmitted by single-carriers, in an AMQD modulation the information is granulated 
into Gaussian subcarrier CVs. These subcarriers divide the physical quantum link into several 
Gaussian sub-channels, leading to an improved transmission rate and higher tolerable excess noise 
overall. An important property of AMQD is that it significantly improves the transmission rates 
in the low-SNR regimes, which is specifically crucial in experimental CVQKD scenarios. The 
AMQD modulation has been extended to SVD-assisted (singular value decomposition) AMQD [6], 
where the SVD of the Gaussian quantum channel derives the eigenchannels of the link. Precisely, 
in the SVD-AMQD, the transmit information of the users are pre-coded by a corresponding uni-
tary operation in the encoding phase, which are then sent through the eigenchannels of the Gaus-
sian channel. The received quantum states are decoded by the inverse post-unitary operation. The 
SVD-assistance leads to further improved transmission rates and the maximum tolerable excess 
noise, which can also be exploited in multiuser CVQKD scenarios. The benefits of AMQD can 
also be extended to a multiuser environment. The AMQD-MQA (multiuser quadrature allocation) 
mechanism [5] is based on the AMQD modulation, more precisely on the sophisticated allocation 
mechanism of the Gaussian subcarrier CVs. In an AMQD-MQA setting, the legal parties use a 
common, shared physical Gaussian link in parallel. In particular, the multicarrier transmission 
improves the multiuser transmission rates, leading to an enhanced simultaneous communication 
through the Gaussian sub-channels. Here we show that the improved classical information trans-
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mission rates allow for the parties to establish higher secret key rates, and to extend the bounda-
ries on the maximal amount of tolerable excess noise of single-carrier CVQKD.  
We derive the security thresholds and prove the secret key rate formulas of multicarrier 
CVQKD. We demonstrate the results for one-way and two-way CVQKD, homodyne and hetero-
dyne measurements, and direct and reverse reconciliation. The multicarrier CVQKD transmission 
is analyzed through the AMQD, the SVD-assisted AMQD, and the multiuser AMQD-MQA 
scheme. We study the impacts of optimal Gaussian attacks on multicarrier CVQKD and deter-
mine the private classical capacity [22, 26–28] of a Gaussian sub-channel. The results reveal that 
the improved transmission rates of multicarrier modulation lead to improved secret key rates, 
higher tolerable excess noise, and better security thresholds. We show that the enhanced secret 
key rates can be extended to a multiuser setting, allowing the legal parties a reliable simultaneous 
private communication over a noisy Gaussian link. For the multiuser scenario of multicarrier 
CVQKD, we define the private classical capacity regions of the users and derive the sum and 
symmetric private classical capacities.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the preliminary findings are summarized. Sec-
tion 3 proposes the proofs of the secret key rate formulas and the security thresholds of multicar-
rier CVQKD. Section 4 discusses the physical boundaries of optimal Gaussian attacks. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes the results. Supplementary information is included in the Appendix. 
 
2  Preliminaries 
First we summarize briefly the notations and basic terms. For further information, see the de-
tailed descriptions of [4–6]. 
 
2.1  Basic Terms and Definitions 
2.1.1  Multicarrier CVQKD 
First we summarize the basic notations of AMQD from [4]. The following description assumes a 
single user, and the use of n Gaussian sub-channels i  for the transmission of the subcarriers, 
from which only l sub-channels will carry valuable information.    
In the single-carrier modulation scheme, the j-th input single-carrier state j j jx pj = +i  is a 
Gaussian state in the phase space  , with i.i.d. Gaussian random position and momentum quad-
ratures ( )
0
20,jx wsÎ  , ( )020,jp wsÎ  , where 02ws  is the modulation variance of the quadra-
tures. (For simplicity, 
0
2
ws  is referred to as the single-carrier modulation variance, throughout.) 
Particularly, this Gaussian single-carrier is transmitted through a Gaussian quantum channel  . 
In the multicarrier scenario, the information is carried by Gaussian subcarrier CVs, 
i i ix pf = + i , ( )20,ix wsÎ  , ( )20,ip wsÎ  , where 2ws  is the modulation variance of the 
subcarrier quadratures, which are transmitted through a noisy Gaussian sub-channel i . Pre-
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cisely, each i  Gaussian sub-channel is dedicated for the transmission of one Gaussian subcarrier 
CV from the n subcarrier CVs. (Note: index l refers to the subcarriers, while index j, to the sin-
gle-carriers, throughout the manuscript.) The single-carrier state jj  in the phase space   can 
be modeled as a zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian random variable 
20,
z j
jz ws
æ ö÷çÎ ÷ç ÷çè ø , with variance 
22
z j
jzws
é ù= ê úë û , and with i.i.d. real and imaginary zero-mean 
Gaussian random components ( ) ( )
0
2Re 0,jz wsÎ  , ( ) ( )02Im 0,jz wsÎ  .  
In the multicarrier CVQKD scenario, let n be the number of Alice’s input single-carrier Gaussian 
states. Precisely, the n input coherent states are modeled by an n-dimensional, zero-mean, circu-
lar symmetric complex random Gaussian vector  
( ) ( )1, , 0,Tnz z= + = Î zz x p K i ,                               (1) 
where each jz  can be modeled as a zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian random 
variable  
20,
z j
jz ws
æ ö÷çÎ ÷ç ÷çè ø , j j jz x p= + i .                                    (2) 
Specifically, the real and imaginary variables (i.e., the position and momentum quadratures) for-
mulate n-dimensional real Gaussian random vectors, ( )1, , Tnx x=x   and ( )1, , Tnp p=p  , 
with zero-mean Gaussian random variables  
( )
2
22
0
0
1
2
xj
jf x e
sw
ws p
-
= , ( )
2
22
0
0
1
2
pj
jf p e
sw
ws p
-
= ,                          (3) 
where zK  is the n n´  Hermitian covariance matrix of z : 
†é ùê úë û=zK zz ,                                               (4) 
while †z  is the adjoint of z .  
For vector z ,  
e eg gé ùé ù é ù= =ê úë û ë ûë ûz z zi i                                        (5) 
holds, and 
( )TT Te e eg g gé ùé ù é ù= =ê úê ú ê úë û ë ûê úë ûzz z z zzi i i2   ,                             (6) 
for any 0,2g pé ùÎ ë û . The density of z  is as follows (if zK  is invertible): 
( ) † 11
detn
f ep
--= z
z
z K z
K
z .                                      (7) 
A n-dimensional Gaussian random vector is expressed as =x As , where A  is an (invertible) 
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linear transform from n  to n , and s  is an n-dimensional standard Gaussian random vector 
( )0,1 n . This vector is characterized by its covariance matrix T Té ù =ê úë û=xK xx AA , as 
( ) ( )
( )21
2 det
.
T
T
n T
e
p
-
=
x x
AA
AA
x                                     (8) 
The Fourier transformation ( )F ⋅  of the n-dimensional Gaussian random vector ( )1, , Tnv v=v   
results in the n-dimensional Gaussian random vector ( )1, , Tnm m=m  , precisely: 
( )
( )2 2 21
0
2 2
m mnT T
F e e
sw- + +-= = =m AA mm v

.                               (9) 
In the first step of AMQD, Alice applies the inverse FFT (fast Fourier transform) operation to 
vector z  (see (1)), which results in an n-dimensional zero-mean, circular symmetric complex 
Gaussian random vector d , ( )0,Î dd K , ( )1, , Tnd d=d  , precisely as 
( )
( )2 2 21
0
2 21
d dnT T
F e e
sw + +-= = =d AA dd z

,                               (10) 
where  
i ii d d
d x p= + i , ( )20,
i
i d
d sÎ  ,                                 (11) 
where 22
di
idws
é ù= ê úë û  and the position and momentum quadratures of if  are i.i.d. Gaussian 
random variables 
( ) ( )2Re 0,
i i
i dd x ws= Î  , ( ) ( )2Im 0,i ii dd p ws= Î  ,                      (12) 
where †é ùê úë û=dK dd , e eg gé ùé ù é ù= =ê úë û ë ûë ûd d di i   , and ( )TT Te e eg g gé ùé ù é ù= =ê úê ú ê úë û ë ûê úë ûdd d d ddi i i2    
for any 0,2g pé ùÎ ë û . 
The ( )T   transmittance vector of   in the multicarrier transmission is 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 , , T nn nT Té ù= Îë ûT     ,                            (13) 
where 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )Re Imi i i i i iT T T= + Î   i ,                         (14) 
is a complex variable, which quantifies the position and momentum quadrature transmission (i.e., 
gain) of the i-th Gaussian sub-channel i , in the phase space  , with real and imaginary parts  
( )0 Re 1 2 ,i iT£ £  and ( )0 Im 1 2i iT£ £ .                  (15) 
Particularly, the ( )i iT   variable has the squared magnitude of  
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( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2Re Imi i i i i iT T T= + Î    ,                       (16) 
where  
( ) ( )Re Imi i i iT T=  .                                      (17) 
The Fourier-transformed transmittance of the i-th sub-channel i  (resulted from CVQFT opera-
tion at Bob) is denoted by  
( )( ) 2i iF T  .                                               (18)  
The n-dimensional zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian noise vector ( )20,
n
sDD Î   
of the quantum channel  , is evaluated as  
( ) ( )1, , 0,Tn DD = D D Î K  ,                                (19) 
where  
†
D é ùê úë= D ûDK  ,                                            (20) 
with independent, zero-mean Gaussian random components  
( )20,
i i
x sD Î   , and ( )20,i ip sD Î   ,                              (21) 
with variance 2
i
s , for each iD  of a Gaussian sub-channel i , which identifies the Gaussian 
noise of the i-th sub-channel i  on the quadrature components in the phase space  .  
The CVQFT-transformed noise vector can be rewritten as 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 , , TnF F FD = D D ,                                   (22) 
with independent components ( ) ( )( )20,i ix FF sD Î    and ( ) ( )( )20,i ip FF sD Î    on the quad-
ratures, for each ( )iF D . Precisely, it also defines an n-dimensional zero-mean, circular symmet-
ric complex Gaussian random vector ( ) ( )( )0, FF DD Î K  with a covariance matrix 
( ) ( ) ( )†F F FD = D Dé ùê úë ûK  ,                                       (23)                     
where ( )F D D=K K , by theory. 
At a constant subcarrier modulation variance 2
iws  for the n Gaussian subcarrier CVs, the corre-
sponding relation is 
2 21
1
,
i
n
n
i
wws s=
=å                                               (24) 
where 2
iws  is the modulation variance of the quadratures of the subcarrier if  transmitted by 
sub-channel i . Assuming l good Gaussian sub-channels from the n with constant quadrature 
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modulation variance 2
iws , where 
2 0
iws =  for the i-th unused sub-channel,  
0
2 2 2
1
i
l
i
l nww ws s s=
= <å .                                       (25) 
In particular, from the relation of (25), for the transmittance parameters the following relation 
follows at a given modulation variance 
0
2
ws , precisely, 
( ) ( )
0 0
2 22 2 ,AMQD iT Tw ws s>                                (26) 
where ( ) 2T   is the transmittance of   in a single-carrier scenario, and 
( ) ( )( )2 21
1
l
AMQD i i il
i
T F T
=
= å  .                             (27) 
For the method of the determination of these l Gaussian sub-channels, see [4]. Alice’s i-th Gaus-
sian subcarrier is precisely expressed as follows: 
( )1i id F zf -= = .                                       (28) 
Specifically, the result of (10) defines n, independent i  Gaussian sub-channels, each with noise 
variance 2
i
s , one for each subcarrier coherent state if . After the CV subcarriers are transmit-
ted through the noisy channel, Bob applies the CVQFT (continuous-variable quantum Fourier 
transform) unitary operation, which gives him the noisy version j jzj ¢ ¢=  of Alice’s single-
carrier input jz . For further details and description of AMQD, see [4]. For the extension of the 
analysis to a multiuser setting, see the derivations of [5]. The description of the SVD-assisted 
multiuser AMQD CVQKD scheme can be found in [6]. 
 
2.1.2  Gaussian States 
A Gaussian density matrix r  can be characterized by a displacement operator and a correlation 
matrix rK  . The rK   can be diagonalized by a corresponding matrix M  [2], such that 
( )1 1s , s , s , sT n ndiagr =M K M   ,                               (29) 
where ( )diag ⋅  refers to a diagonal matrix, and si -s are real elements which formulate the r  
symplectic spectra (symplectic eigenspectrum of rK  ) as 
( )1s , snr =  .                                           (30) 
Particularly, a two-mode entangled Gaussian density r  with variance 2ws  can be characterized 
by the rK   of 
2 4
4 2
1
1
I Z
Z I
w w
r
w w
s s
s s
æ ö- ÷ç ÷ç ÷= ç ÷ç ÷ç - ÷è ø
K

,                                  (31) 
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where I is the identity matrix, ( )1,1I diag= , while Z refers to the Pauli Z matrix, 
( )1, 1Z diag= - . The ( )S ⋅  entropy of r  can be expressed as 
( ) ( )
1
s
n
i
i
S gr
=
= å ,                                           (32) 
where 
( ) s 1 s 1 s 1 s 12 22 2 2 2s log logi i i iig + + - -= - .                                  (33) 
 
2.1.3  Private Classical Capacity 
The ( )P   private classical capacity of   in direct reconciliation (DR, i.e., from Alice to Bob) 
is defined as 
( ) ( ) ( )( )max : :
i
DRP I A B I A E
r"
= - ,                             (34) 
where ( ):I A B  is the mutual information between Alice and Bob, while ( ):I A E  is the mutual 
information between Alice and Eve. In the reverse reconciliation (RR, i.e., from Bob to Alice), the 
corresponding capacity is 
( ) ( ) ( )( )max : :
i
RRP I A B I B E
r"
= - ,                             (35) 
where ( ):I B E  is the mutual information between Bob and Eve.  
Assuming collective (joint) measurement in the protocol runs on Bob’s and Eve’s sides (also re-
ferred to as collective CVQKD protocols), the related DR and RR formulas are 
( ) ( ) ( )( )max : :
i
DRP A B A E
r
c c
"
= -                              (36) 
and 
( ) ( ) ( )( )max : :
i
RRP A B I B E
r
c
"
= - ,                             (37) 
where c  is the Holevo quantity. We use collective protocols in the evaluation of the secret key 
rates in Section 3.  
Note that for collective protocols, the ( ):I B E  function causes negative divergence in (37) (ex-
cept in one-way collective CVQKD at heterodyne measurement) [2]; thus these RR rate formulas 
are derived via  
( ) ( ) ( )( )max : :
i
RRP I A B B E
r
c
"
= - .                            (38) 
 
2.2  Optimal Gaussian Attack on Multicarrier CVQKD 
First we analyze the correlation of Alice and Bob’s quadratures in an AMQD modulation, for a 
homodyne and heterodyne measurement, homM  and hetM . Then we characterize the correlation 
measures at an optimal Gaussian attack on the multicarrier transmission. 
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2.2.1  Private Classical Capacity of a Gaussian Sub-Channel 
In this section we derive the private classical capacity of a Gaussian sub-channel i  for direct 
and reverse reconciliation. The formal analysis of this section will be completed in Section 3 with 
the single-carrier formulas, since in an AMQD modulation the subcarriers are converted back to 
single-carriers at the decoder via the CVQFT operation. 
Let ,i ix p  refer to Alice’s i-th Gaussian subcarrier CV if , and ,i ix p¢ ¢  to Bob’s noisy subcarrier 
quadratures, 2 2 2
i
i ix p ws= =  and ( )( ) 22 2 2 2i ii i i ix p F T ws s¢ ¢= = +  . Following the 
formalism of [1-2] throughout, Alice’s estimators 
ix
e ¢  and ipe ¢  on Bob’s ix ¢  and ip¢  quadratures are 
precisely evaluated as 
,i ix A x i
e xe¢ ¢= , 2, ,i ii i
x x
A x x
e ¢¢ =                                    (39) 
with a conditional variance 
( ) 2222 2ˆ i iii x ii x xi x ix e xx e xs ¢
¢
¢¢ ¢ ¢= - = - ,                            (40) 
and 
,i ip A p i
e pe¢ ¢= , 2, ,i ii i
p p
A p p
e ¢¢ =                                   (41) 
with a conditional variance 
( ) 2222 2ˆ i iii p ii p pi p ip e pp e ps ¢
¢
¢¢ ¢ ¢= - = - .                           (42) 
Bob’s estimators 
ix
e  and 
ip
e  on Alice’s ix  and ip  quadratures are 
,i ix B x i
e xe ¢= , 
2, ,
i i
i i
x x
B x x
e ¢¢=                                     (43) 
( ) 2222 2ˆ i iii x ii x xi x ix e xx e xs
¢
¢= - = - ,                            (44) 
,i ip B p i
e pe ¢= , 
2, ,
i i
i i
p p
B p p
e ¢¢=                                    (45) 
( ) 2222 2ˆ i iii p ii p pi p ip e pp e ps
¢
¢= - = - .                            (46) 
In particular, the optimal Gaussian attack is performed by an Eve  entangling cloner [1–4]. Us-
ing Eve’s quadratures ,E ix  and ,E ip , Eve’s estimators 
i
E
x
e  and 
i
E
p
e  on Alice’s quadratures are as 
follows [1]: 
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, ,ii
E
E x E ix
e xe= , ,
2
,
, ,
i E i
i E i
x x
E x x
e =                                   (47) 
( ) 2,2
,
2
2 2ˆ E i iE
ii E ixi
x xE
i ixx e x
x e xs = - = - ,                            (48) 
, ,ii
E
E p E ip
e pe= , ,
2
,
, ,
i E i
i E i
p p
E p p
e =                                   (49) 
( ) 2,2
,
2
2 2ˆ E i iE
ii E ipi
p pE
i ipp e p
p e ps = - = - .                           (50) 
Eve’s estimators on Bob’s quadratures are referred to as 
i
E
x
e ¢ , i
E
p
e ¢ , and expressed as: 
, ,ii
E
E x E ix
e xe ¢¢ = , ,2
,
, ,
i E i
i E i
x x
E x x
e ¢¢ =                                   (51) 
( ) 2,2
,
2
2 2ˆ E i iE
ii E ixi
x xE
i ixx e x
x e xs
¢
¢
¢¢ ¢= - = - ,                             (52) 
, ,ii
E
E p E ip
e pe ¢¢ = , ,2
,
, ,
i E i
i E i
p p
E p p
e ¢¢ =                                    (53) 
( ) 2,2
,
2
2 2ˆ E i iE
ii E ipi
p pE
i ipp e p
p e ps
¢
¢
¢¢ ¢= - = - .                            (54) 
Particularly, assuming that Eve attacks each if  Gaussian subcarriers via an Eve  entangling 
cloner with transmittance ,Eve iT  for the i-th subcarrier, the conditional variances on Alice and 
Bob’s estimators are precisely as follows:  
2
2
2 2 ,i xi
ix x ii i
x e
xe e x
es
¢
= -                                      (55) 
2
2
2 2 .i pi
ip p ii i
p e
pe e p
es
¢
= -                                      (56) 
For Eve’s quadratures in the RR direction 
2
,
2
,
2 2 ,E i xiE
ix E ixi i
x e
xe e x
es
¢
= -                                    (57) 
2
,
2
,
2 2 .E i piE
ip E ipi i
p e
pe e p
es
¢
= -                                    (58) 
For the DR direction 
2
,
2
,
2 2 E i xi
E
ix E ixi i
x e
xe e x
es ¢
¢ ¢
= - ,                                   (59) 
2
,
2
,
2 2 E i pi
E
ip E ipi i
p e
pe e p
es ¢
¢ ¢
= - .                                   (60) 
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Precisely, in a collective attack, Eve is assumed to use a quantum memory and to perform a joint 
measurement; thus the corresponding correlation function is the Holevo information ( ):A Ec  
and ( ):B Ec , for the DR and RR cases, respectively. If Bob is also allowed to use collective 
measurement, then ( ):A Bc  quantifies the correlation between Alice and Bob. See Section 3. 
The parameters of an entangling cloner attack in AMQD are summarized in Figure 1. 

,
i ix p
e e¢ ¢
,i ix p

,
i ix p
e e
,i ix p¢ ¢
i
EB i
Y
2 2
, 1Eve i iT T= -
Eve
BS
2
iT
Alice Bob
U M
( )CVQFT ( )Collective, ; ,i i i iE E E Ex p x pe e e e¢ ¢
, ,,E i E ix p
 
Figure 1. The entangling cloner attack in an AMQD modulation. Eve is equipped with a BS 
with transmittance 22 ,1i Eve iT T= -  for the attacking of each Gaussian sub-channels i . She 
puts the l Gaussian subcarriers into a quantum memory, then applies the U  (CVQFT) unitary 
operation to recover the single-carrier CV. She then puts the recovered single-carrier Gaussian 
CV into a quantum register. At the end of the protocol run, she applies an M  collective meas-
urement on her register.  
 
For simplicity, in this section we use the functions ( ):A Bc , ( ):B Ec  and ( ):A Ec . From 
(55) and (56), the ( ):x A Bc  and ( ):p A Bc  between Alice and Bob are 
( )
( )
2
2
2
2
1
22
1
22
: log ,
: log .
xi
e ex xi i
pi
e ep pi i
e
x
e
p
A B
A B
s
s
c
c
¢
¢
=
=
                                    (61) 
From (57) and (58), the Holevo information between Bob and Eve is 
( )
( )
( )
( )
2 2
2 2
,2
2
,
2 2
2 2
,2
2
,
1 1
2 22 2
1 1
2 22 2
: log log ,
: log log .
x xi i
x eE E i xe e ixi xi xi xE i
p pi i
p eE E i pe e ipi pi pi pE i
e e
x
e
e e
p
e
B E
B E
s
s
c
c
¢
¢
-
-
= =
= =
                     (62) 
 12
While from (59) and (60), the Holevo quantities between Alice and Eve are 
( )
( )
( )
( )
2 2
2 2
,2
2
,
2 2
2 2
,2
2
,
1 1
2 22 2
1 1
2 22 2
: log log ,
: log log .
x xi i
x eE E i xe e ixi xi xi xE i
p pi i
p eE E i pe e ipi pi pi pE i
e e
x
e
e e
p
e
A E
A E
s
s
c
c
¢ ¢
¢¢ ¢
¢ ¢
¢¢ ¢
-
-
= =
= =
                      (63) 
Specifically, the reverse reconciliation RRxS , 
RR
pS  secret key rates from (61) and (62) are as fol-
lows:  
( ) ( ): :RRx x xS A B B Ec c= - ,                                  (64) 
( ) ( ): :RRp p pS A B B Ec c= - .                                  (65) 
The DRxS , 
DR
pS  secret key rates in direct reconciliation are expressed from (61) and (63) as 
( ) ( ): :DRx x xS A B A Ec c= - ,                                  (66) 
( ) ( ): :DRp p pS A B A Ec c= - .                                  (67) 
To express these rates, we first define the ( )iP   private classical capacity of an i  Gaussian 
quantum channel in the AMQD modulation.  
In particular, the *SNRi  (signal to noise ratio) of the i-th Gaussian sub-channel i  for the 
transmission of private classical information (i.e., for the derivation of the secret key rate) under 
an optimal Gaussian attack is expressed as  
2
2
*
*SNR i
i
i
ws
s=

,                                              (68) 
where *2
i
s  is precisely evaluated as  
( )( )
( )( )
22 2
* 22 2
1
2 2
1
1
i ii i
ii i ii i
F T
F T
w
w
s s
w s s
s s C
C
-+
+
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= - ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø

 
,                            (69) 
where 
2 2
0 ,
i
iNs sC = +                                            (70) 
and where 2s  is the vacuum noise and iN  is the excess noise of the Gaussian sub-channel i  
defined as 
( ) ( )( )
( )
2
,
2
,
1
1
i Eve i
Eve i
W F T
i
F T
N
-
-
= ,                                         (71) 
where iW  is the variance of Eve’s EPR state used for the attacking of i , while  
2 2
, 1Eve i iT T= -                                           (72) 
is the transmittance of Eve’s beam splitter (BS), while 2iT  is the transmittance of i . 
Particularly, from (69) the ( )iP   (real domain) is expressed as 
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( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
2 22 2 2
2 22 2
*
22 2
0
22 2
0
1 1
2 22 2 1
1
22 1
log 1 log
log .
i i i ii i i
i ii ii
i i ii
i i ii
F T F T
i
F T
F T N
N F T
P w w
w
w
w
s s s
s s s
s s
s s
C
C
+
+
+ +
+ +
æ ö æ ö÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç= + =÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç ÷÷ è øè ø
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø

 




             (73) 
Putting the pieces together, the (real domain) private classical capacities ( )RR iP   and 
( )DR iP   for a given Gaussian sub-channel i  are precisely expressed as  
( )
( )
2 2 2
2 2
2
2
1 1
2 22 2
max log log ,Ai i i
E ei Ai i
Ai Ei
e
RR
i si
e
P w
s s
s
C
C
+
+"
-
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷= -ç ÷÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø
                    (74) 
where 2
iA
e  is Bob’s estimator on Alice’s system iA , while iE  is Eve’s system, and 
( )
( )
2 2 2
2 2
2
2
1 1
2 22 2
max log log ,Bi i i
E ei Bi i
Bi Ei
e
DR
i si
e
P w
s s
s
C
C
+
+" -
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷= -ç ÷÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø
                     (75) 
where 2
iB
e  is Alice’s estimator on Bob’s system iB , while iE  is Eve’s system. The detailed 
secret key rate formulas for the AMQD transmission are given in an extended form in Section 3.  
 
3  Secret Key Rates of AMQD and AMQD-MQA 
In this section, we prove the secret key rates of AMQD [4], SVD-assisted AMQD [6], and AMQD-
MQA [5] for collective CVQKD protocols, following the formalisms of [1] and [2]. The secret key 
rates of AMQD are evaluated for the case of n Gaussian subcarriers and l  Gaussian sub-channels 
with i Even n< . The variance of Eve’s EPR ancilla is iW  for the attack of a sub-channel i  [2–
3]. For the multiuser scenario of AMQD-MQA, K users are assumed for the parallel use of the 
Gaussian quantum channel. The subcarrier Gaussian CVs of Alice, Bob, and Eve will be referred 
to as iA , iB , and iE , respectively. The single-carrier Gaussian CVs are referred to as jA , jB , 
and jE .  
 
Theorem 1 (AMQD secret key rates). The AMQD leads to improved secret key rates in a 
CVQKD scenario in comparison to a single-carrier CVQKD. 
 
Proof. 
In the first part of the proof, we reveal the secret key rates of AMQD for one-way CVQKD, as-
suming homodyne and heterodyne measurements with RR and DR. In the second part, we reveal 
the secret key rates of AMQD for two-way CVQKD. Finally, we conclude the results with the 
analysis of the secret key rates of the SVD-assisted AMQD. 
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3.1  AMQD Secret Key Rates in One-Way CVQKD 
Let ii i id x p= +  refer to Alice’s i-th Gaussian subcarrier CV if , where the Gaussian variables 
ix  and ip  refer to the position and momentum quadratures ix , ip  of the phase-space Gaussian 
subcarrier CV ii i ix pf = +  . Following the formalism of [2] throughout the analysis, the quad-
ratures particularly can be precisely rewritten as 
i i i ix x x x= +                                              (76) 
and 
i i i ip p p p= +  .                                           (77) 
Specifically, the modulation variances of ix  and ip  are referred to as 2
ix
s  and 2ips , respectively, 
such that 
( )
2 2
2 2 21 ,
i i
i i i i
x p
x x p pw
s s
s s s
=
= - + +
 
 
                                (78) 
where 
2 2 1
i i i ix x p p
s s= =  ,                                         (79) 
thus (78) can be rewritten as 
2 2 2
i ix p ws s s= =  .                                           (80) 
Let the variance of Eve’s EPR ancilla used for the attack of the i-th Gaussian sub-channel i  to 
be referred as iW . The covariance matrix of Eve’s i-th density matrix iE EB EB ir = Y Y  is ex-
pressed as [2]  
2
2
1
1E EB EB ii
i i
i i
W I W Z
W Z W I
r = Y Y
æ ö- ÷ç ÷ç ÷= ç ÷ç ÷ç - ÷è ø
K .                           (81) 
Assuming that Bob receives a noisy Gaussian subcarrier CV ii i ix pf¢ ¢ ¢= +  , the Gaussian sub-
carrier CV can be rewritten as ii i id x p¢ ¢ ¢= + . The noisy subcarrier quadratures ix ¢  and ip¢  of the 
received if¢  have variance 2ws  as 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )
2 2 2
2 2 2
,
2 2 21 .
i ix p
Eve i i i i
i i i i i
F T W F T
F T W F T
w
w
w
s s s
s
s
¢ ¢= =
= +
= - +
  

 
                      (82) 
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In particular, the variance 2
Ews  of Eve’s subcarrier quadratures ,E ix  and ,E ip  are evaluated for 
the attacking of the i-th subcarrier Gaussian CV if¢  as 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )
, ,
2 2 2
2 22
,
2 221 .
E E i E ix p
Eve i i i i
i i i i i
F T F T W
F T F T W
w
w
w
s s s
s
s
= =
= +
= - +
 

 
                 (83) 
Precisely, the 2 2,
i i i ix x p p
s s¢ ¢   conditional variances of Alice’s variables and Bob’s noisy subcarrier 
quadratures are evaluated as  
( ) ( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )
2 2 2
2 2
,
2 2
1 .
i i i i i iB A x x p p
Eve i i i i
i i i i i
F T W F T
F T W F T
s s s¢ ¢= =
= +
= - +
 

 
                   (84) 
Specifically, the conditional variances of Alice’s variables and Eve’s noisy subcarrier quadratures 
are 
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
, ,
2 2 2
2 2
,
2 2
1 .
i i E i i E i iE A x x p p
Eve i i i i
i i i i i
F T F T W
F T F T W
s s s¢ ¢= =
= +
= - +
 

 
                       (85) 
From 2
i iB A
s  and 2
i iE A
s , the covariance matrices 
Bi
rK  and Eir
K  of the density 
iB i i
r f f¢ ¢=  of 
the noisy ii i ix pf¢ ¢ ¢= +  , and Eve’s density matrix iE EB EB ir = Y Y  are  
2
B Ei
Ir ws=K                                              (86) 
and 
2
,E
Ei
i
i i
I Z
Z W I
w
r
s k
k
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= ÷ç ÷ç ÷çè ø
K                                         (87) 
while ik  is precisely as 
( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )
2 2
,
2 2
1 1
1 .
i Eve i i
i i i
F T W
F T W
k = - -
= -
                                (88) 
From (86) and (87), the 
B Ei i
rK  covariance of the i-th joint density matrix of Bob and Eve, i iB Er  
is precisely expressed as [2] 
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,
,
E i ii
B Ei i
Bi i i
T
r m q
r
rm q
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷= ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø
K K
K
K K
,                                      (89) 
where ,i im qK  is 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( )( )( )
2 22
,
2 2
, ,
2 2
.1
1 1
i i
i Eve i i i
i
Eve i i
i
i i i
W F T F T I
I
F T WZ Z
F T W
w
m q
s
m
q
æ ö÷ç - ÷ç ÷ç ÷çæ ö ÷ç ÷÷ æ öç ç ÷÷ç ÷= = ç ÷ç÷ - ÷ç ç ÷÷ ç ÷÷ç ç ÷è ø ç ÷ ÷çç ÷ ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç = - - ÷÷ç ÷çè è ø ø
K


              (90) 
Specifically, for the quadratures ,i ix p  of the i-th Gaussian subcarrier CV, the conditional covari-
ance matrices [2] are precisely 
( )21,
i i i ix x p p ws¢ ¢= =K K K ,                                    (91) 
( )21,
i i i iE x E p ws= =K K K ,                                    (92) 
( ), ,i i i ix p x p I¢ ¢ =K K ,                                        (93) 
and 
( ),i i iE x p I=K K .                                         (94) 
Without loss of generality, assuming l n<  Gaussian subcarriers for the information transmission, 
from the conditional variances 2
i iB A
s  and 2
i iE A
s  of the Gaussian subcarriers, the average condi-
tional variances 2ˆ
j jB A
s  and 2ˆ
j jE A
s  are evaluated as 
2 21
1
ˆ
i ij j
l
B AB A l
i
s s
=
= å , and 2 21
1
ˆ
i ij j
l
E AE A l
i
s s
=
= å ,                      (95) 
where 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
2 2 21 1
1 1
2 21 1
,
1 1
2 21 1 1
1 1 1
2 21 1
1 1
ˆ
1
1 ,
i ij j
l l
x pB A l l
i i
l l
Eve i i i il l
i i
l l l
i i i i il l l
i i i
l l
i i i il l
i i
F T W F T
F T W F T
F T W F T
s s s¢ ¢
= =
= =
= = =
= =
= =
= +
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= - +÷ç ÷ç ÷çè ø
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= - +÷ç ÷ç ÷çè ø
å å
å å
å å å
å å
 

 
 
            (96) 
where 1 illW W= å , and 
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( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
, ,
2 2 21 1
1 1
2 21 1
,
1 1
2 21 1 1
1 1 1
2 21 1
1 1
ˆ
1
1 .
E i E ij j
l l
x pE A l l
i i
l l
Eve i i i il l
i i
l l l
i i i i il l l
i i i
l l
i i i il l
i i
F T F T W
F T F T W
F T F T W
s s s
= =
= =
= = =
= =
= =
= +
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= - +÷ç ÷ç ÷çè ø
æ ö æ ö÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç= - +÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç çè ø è ø
å å
å å
å å å
å å
 

 
 
            (97) 
Particularly, using the covariance matrices of (91)–(94), the symplectic spectra [2] can be con-
structed for the Gaussian subcarriers. We omit this step and show only the symplectic spectra of 
the Gaussian single-carriers recovered from the Gaussian subcarriers via the CVQFT operation; 
because the secret key rate formulas will also use this representation. 
 
3.1.1  Homodyne Measurement, Reverse Reconciliation 
In the case of homodyne measurement, Bob first applies for all collected if  subcarriers the 
CVQFT operation to recover the Gaussian single-carrier CV ij j jx pj¢ ¢ ¢= + , which is the noisy 
version of Alice’s Gaussian single-carrier CV ij j jx pj = + . The quadratures are referred to as 
( ),j jx p  and ( ),j jx p¢ ¢ . Bob then measures via homM  a noisy quadrature jx ¢  or jp¢  randomly from 
the quadrature pair ( ),j jx p¢ ¢  of jj¢ , for 1, ,j N=  .  
3.1.1.1  Private classical capacity of a Gaussian sub-channel 
First we derive the ( )RR iP   private classical capacity of a Gaussian sub-channel i . Alice’s 
conditional variance on Bob’s received subcarrier quadratures ,i ix p¢ ¢  for the i-th Gaussian subcar-
rier CV are precisely as follows:  
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
2
2
2 2
2 22
0
2 2
0,
i xi
ix x ii i
i
i
x e
xe e x
i i i i
i i
e
F T F T sN
F T s N
s
s
s
¢
C
C
= -
= +
= +
 

                  (98) 
where 0N  is the shot-noise variance and s  is the squeezing factor, which is 1s =  for coherent 
states and constrained into the range of 
2
21
i
i
s
w ws
s< <  [1], and 
( )( ) ( )
2
2
2 2
2 2 1
0,
i pi
ip p ii i
i
p e
pe e p
i i s
e
F T N
s
s
¢
C
= -
= +
                              (99) 
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where 2
iws  is the modulation variance of the quadratures ,i ix p  of the i-th subcarrier if . Specifi-
cally, after some calculations, the following relations follow for the conditional variances of (55) 
and (56): 
( )( ) 222 2 1 0,
ix xi i i
i ie e
F T N
ws
s s
¢ C
æ ö÷ç ÷³ +ç ÷ç ÷è ø                               (100) 
( )( ) 222 2 1 0,
ip pi i i
i ie e
F T N
ws
s s
¢ C
æ ö÷ç ÷³ +ç ÷ç ÷è ø                             (101) 
and for Eve’s estimators  
( )( ) 2 2 1
2
2 1
0,E
x xi i
i i i
i
e e
F T
N
sw
s
s
¢
C
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷ç + ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø
=

                                (102) 
( )( ) 2 2 1
2
2 1
0.E
p pi i
i i i
i
e e
F T
N
sw
s
s
¢
C
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷ç + ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø
=

                                (103) 
Precisely, from (98) and (99), the ( ):xI A B  and ( ):pI A B  between Alice and Bob are 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
2
2 2
0
2
2 2 1
0
1
22
1
22
: log ,
: log ,
xi
i i i
xi
i i si
e
x
F T s N
e
p
F T N
I A B
I A B
s
s
C
C
+
+
=
=


                          (104) 
and from (57) and (58), the Holevo quantities between Bob and Eve are 
( )
( )( )
( )
( )( )
2
1
0
2 12
2
2
1
0
2 12
2
1
22
1
22
: log ,
: log .
xi
F Ti i
i
i
pi
F Ti i
i
i
e
x N
e
p N
B E
B E
s
sw
s
sw
c
c
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷+ç ÷÷ç C ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷çè ø
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷+ç ÷÷ç C ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷çè ø
=
=


                          (105) 
The reverse reconciliation RRxS , 
RR
pS  secret key rates from (61) and (62) are as follows:  
( ) ( ): :RRx x xS I A B B Ec= - ,                                 (106) 
( ) ( ): :RRp p pS I A B B Ec= - .                                 (107) 
Particularly, the private classical capacity ( )RR iP   for a given i  is expressed as  
( ) (
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
2 2
2
2
2 2 2 22 21
2
1
22
2 2 2 22 2 21 1
22
1 1
22
max log
log
max log .
i i
i
i i i
i
i i i i i i i ii i
i
RR
i si
i i i i i i i i
i
F T F T F T F T s
P
F T F T F T F T
w
w
sw
s s
s
w s
s s
s s s
C
C
C C
+
+"
C C
æ ö÷" ç ÷ç ÷ç + +÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø
= -
æ æ ööö÷÷÷ç ç ÷÷÷+ +ç ç ÷÷÷ç ç ÷÷÷è è øøø
=
   

                   
(108) 
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3.1.1.2  Secret key rate 
In the next step, the hom,RR Mone wayS -  secret key rate is evaluated for the recovered single-carrier Gaus-
sian CVs. Introducing the notation ⋅  for the variance of the quadratures, for Bob’s noisy quad-
ratures (which noise arise from Eve’s Gaussian attack, which will noise be corrected in the post-
processing phase) ( )( )
0
22 2 2 21
j j i ill
x p F T ws s¢ ¢= = +å  . Eve’s quadratures are ex-
pressed as ( )( )
0
22 2 2 21
, ,E j E j i ill
x p F T ws s= = +å  . Bob performs homM , which gives 
him the estimator operators 
jx
e ¢  or jpe ¢ . Specifically, Bob’s estimator operators ,E j
B
x
e  and 
,E j
B
p
e  on 
Eve’s noisy quadrature ,E jx  are precisely as follows [1]: 
,,
, E jE j
B
B x jx
e xe ¢= , ,
2,,
,E j j
E j j
x x
B x x
e ¢¢=                               (109) 
( ) 2,2
,, ,
2
2 2
, ,ˆ
j E j
B
E jE j jxE j
x xB
E j E jxx e x
x e xs ¢ ¢= - = - ,                       (110) 
and since 
j jE B EB EB j
r = Y Y  is an entangled state,   
,,
, E jE j
B
B p jp
e pe ¢= - , ,
2,,
,E j j
E j j
p p
B p p
e ¢¢=                                 (111) 
( ) 2,2
,, ,
2
2 2
, ,ˆ
j E j
E jE j p jE j
p pB
E j E jpp e p
p e ps ¢ ¢= - = - .                       (112) 
From the estimators 
,E j
B
x
e  and 
,E j
B
p
e , precisely the following relations bring up: 
2
2
,
2 2 2 2
, , 0 ,
j
E j
x
j E j j E j p
x x x x N
¢¢ ¢£ -                            (113) 
2
2
,
2 2 2 2
, , 0 .
j
E j
p
j E j j E j x
p p p p N
¢¢ ¢£ -                            (114) 
Specifically, a commutation relation argument [1] then yields  
( ) ( ),,, , , , , , , ,, , , ,E jE jBE j E j E j E j B x j E j E j E jxx e p x p x p x peé ù é ù é ù¢- = - =ê ú ë û ë ûë û ,              (115) 
( ) ( ),,, , , , , , , ,, , , ,E jE jBE j E j E j E j B p j E j E j E jpp e x p x p x p xeé ù é ù é ù¢- = - =ê ú ë û ë ûë û .             (116) 
In particular, since Eve uses an EPR state 
j jE B EB EB j
r = Y Y  for attacking (e.g., in an 
AMQD multicarrier scenario, the joint density matrix 
j jE B
r  models the l instances of EPR state 
j j i i
ll
E B EB EBE B i
r r ÄÄ= = Y Y ) , the following relations hold for the joint system of Bob and 
Eve: 
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( )( )
2
,
,
2 2 210
0
ˆ
1
Bx eE j xE j
i ill
N F T w
s
s s+
= å 
 and ( )( )
2
,
,
2 2 210
0
ˆ
1
Bp eE j pE j
i ill
N F T w
s
s s+
= å 
,        (117) 
( )( ) 2 2 21, ,, , 0
2 2 1
0ˆ ˆB B
E j E jx p i iE j E j ll
x e p e F T
N
ws s
s s
+
= = å 
,                       (118) 
( )( )( )
0
22 2 21
, 0j E j i ill
x x F T Nws s¢ = +å  ,                       (119) 
( )( )( )
0
22 2 21
, 0j E j i ill
p p F T Nws s¢ = - +å  .                     (120) 
Particularly, the homM  leads to covariance matrices for Bob’s measured quadrature jx ¢  or jp ¢  
conditioned on Alice’s (single-carrier) Gaussian variable jx  or jp , precisely as 
( )
0
21,
j j j jx x p p ws¢ ¢= =K K K .                                 (121) 
Specifically, in the case of homM  and reverse reconciliation, the corresponding j jE xK , j jE pK  
conditional covariance matrices of Eve’s system are precisely evaluated as 
( )
0
21,
j j j jE x E p ws= =K K K .                                 (122) 
Without loss of generality, assuming that ( )( ) 210 1i ill F T< <å   for the l Gaussian sub-
channels i  and 
0
2 1ws   holds, the following symplectic spectra can be constructed for Bob’s 
system, jB : 
( )( )( )
0
2 21
j jx p i ill
F T ws¢ ¢= = å   ,                              (123) 
( )( )( )
0
22 21ˆ
j j j j j j
i ix x p p B A ll
F T ws s¢ ¢= = å   ,                      (124) 
and for Eve’s system, jE , precisely: 
( )( )( )( )
0
2 21 11 ,
jE i i il ll l
F T Wws= - å å  .                        (125) 
In particular, in case of a reverse reconciliation, the related symplectic spectra 
j jE x ¢  and j jE p¢  
are evaluated as follows [2]: 
( )( ) ( )( )( )21 02 21 1 11 ,1 .j j j j i ill i i iE x E p l ll lF T F T Wws¢ ¢
æ ö÷ç ÷= = -ç ÷ç ÷çè øå å å          (126) 
Finally, for the joint system 
j jB E
r  of Bob and Eve, the , ,,j j j jx E p E¢ ¢   symplectic spectra are 
 21
( )
0
2
, , ,1,1j j j jx E p E ws¢ ¢= =  .                                  (127) 
Note, as it has been mentioned in Section 2.1.3, in case of RR, the secret key rate formulas 
hom,RR M
one wayS - , hom
,RR M
two wayS - , het
,RR M
two wayS -  are evaluated from the difference of functions ( ):I A B  and the 
( ):B Ec , because ( ):I B E  causes negative divergence in the rate formulas of (37) [2].  
Particularly, using the related covariance matrices of (121)–(122), the symplectic spectra of (123)
–(125) and (126)–(127), the mutual information ( ):I A B  and Holevo quantity ( ):B Ec  are 
determined, from which the hom,RR Mone wayS -  asymptotic secret key rate for the RR, homM , AMQD 
modulation in one-way CVQKD is as follows: 
( ) ( )
( )( )( )
hom
1 1 1 1 1
2 21
,
1 1 1 11
2 2 22 2 2 2 2ˆ1
: :
log log log ,i i i i il l l l ll l l l l
i ill B Aj j
RR M
one way
W W W W W
F T
S I A B B E
s
c-
+ + - -
-
= -
æ öå å å å å ÷ç= - - ÷ç ÷çè øå 
   (128) 
where 2ˆ
j jB A
s  has been derived in (96). 
■ 
3.1.2  Homodyne Measurement, Direct Reconciliation 
3.1.2.1  Private classical capacity of a Gaussian sub-channel 
Without loss of generality, using a slightly modified version of the corresponding terms of Section 
2.2.1, the ( )DR iP   private classical capacity of i  is follows from (75). 
3.1.2.2  Secret key rate 
The secret key rate hom,DR Mone wayS -  is then evaluated as follows. In case of direct reconciliation, for the 
variance of the quadratures, for Alice’s quadratures 
0
2 2 2
j jx p ws= = , and Eve’s quadratures 
are ( )( )
0
22 2 2 21
, ,E j E j i ill
x p F T ws s= = +å  . Particularly, the systems of Alice and Eve 
are modeled as independent quantum systems, and using the estimator operators 
,E j
A
x
e  and 
,E j
A
p
e  
on Alice’s side, the following relations hold for the estimation of Eve’s noisy quadrature ,E jx  at 
homM : 
,,
, E jE j
A
A x jx
e xe= , ,
2,,
,E j j
E j j
x x
A x x
e =                              (129) 
,,
, E jE j
A
A p jp
e pe= , ,
2,,
.E j j
E j j
p p
A p p
e =                             (130) 
From 
,E j
A
x
e  and 
,E j
A
p
e , the following conditional variances bring up: 
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( ) 2,2
,, ,
2
2 2
, ,ˆ
j E j
A
E jE j jxE j
x xA
E j E jxx e x
x e xs = - = - ,                      (131) 
( ) 2,2
,, ,
2
2 2
, ,ˆ
j E j
A
E jE j jpE j
p pA
E j E jpp e p
p e ps = - = - ,                     (132) 
where 
( )( )( ) ( )( )
2
2
,
2 2
0 0
2 2 210 0
0
2 2 2 2
, , 0
22 21 ,
j
E j
i ill
x
j E j j E j p
N
i ill F T
x x x x N
F T w
w
s
w w s s
s s
+
£ -
= - åå 
              (133) 
( )( )( ) ( )( )
2
2
,
2 2
0 0
2 2 210 0
0
2 2 2 2
, , 0
22 2 21 .
j
E j
i ill
p
j E j j E j x
N
i ill F T
p p p p N
F T w
w
s
w w s s
s s s
+
£ -
= + - åå  
     (134)                     
Then the commutation relation [1] leads to 
( ) ( ),,, , , , , , , ,, , , ,E jE jAE j E j E j E j A x j E j E j E jxx e p x p x p x peé ù é ù é ù- = - =ê ú ë û ë ûë û ,             (135) 
( ) ( ),,, , , , , , , ,, , , ,E jE jAE j E j E j E j A p j E j E j E jpp e x p x p x p xeé ù é ù é ù- = - =ê ú ë û ë ûë û .            (136) 
Specifically, assuming the use of coherent Gaussian CVs for the transmission, a corresponding 
relation yields as 
2
,
,
0
ˆ
1
Ax eE j xE j
N
s
=  and 
2
,
,
0
ˆ
1
Ap eE j pE j
N
s
= ,                                (137) 
thus 
, ,, ,
2 2
0ˆ ˆA A
E j E jx pE j E j
x e p e
Ns s= = .                                   (138) 
For Eve’s system jE , the corresponding covariance matrices are evaluated as follows: 
( )
0
21,
j j j jE x E p ws= =K K K .                                  (139) 
In particular, for the direct reconciliation, the symplectic spectra 
j jE x
  and 
j jE p
  are precisely 
as follows [2]: 
( )( )( )
0
22 2 2 21 1ˆ ˆ ˆ1 ,
j j j j j j j j j j
i i iE x E p E A B A E Al lll
F T Wws s s s
æ ö÷ç= = - ÷ç ÷çè øå å   .       (140) 
Without loss of generality, by utilizing the covariance matrices of (121) and (139), the symplectic 
spectra of (123)–(125), and (139)–(140), the Holevo quantities of ( ):A Bc  and ( ):A Ec  the 
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hom,DR M
one wayS -  asymptotic secret key rate for the DR, homM , AMQD modulation in one-way CVQKD 
is precisely as follows: 
( ) ( )
( )( )( )
( )( )( )( )
hom
2 21
2 21
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1
1 1
,
ˆ
1
22 ˆ1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 1 1
2 22 2 2 2
1
22
: :
log
log log
log
i ill E Aj j
i ill B Aj j
i i i il l l ll l l lB A E A B A E A B A E A B A E Aj j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j
ill l
DR M
one way
F T
F T
W W W W
W W
S A B A E
s
s
s s s s s s s s
c c-
-
+ + - -
+
= -
å
å
æ öå å å å ÷ç ÷ç+ - ÷ç ÷ç ÷çè ø
å-


1 11 1 1
22 2 2
log .i i il l ll l
W W+ - -æ öå å å ÷ç - ÷ç ÷çè ø
 
(141)                
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3.1.3  Heterodyne Measurement, Reverse Reconciliation 
3.1.3.1  Private classical capacity of a Gaussian sub-channel 
Particularly, similar to Section 3.1.2.1, we can use a slightly modified version of (98)–(103); thus 
the ( )RR iP   private classical capacity of i  is coincidences to (74).                   
3.1.3.2  Secret key rate 
In case of hetM  and RR, Bob obtains both of the estimators 
, ,
,
E j E j
B B
x p
e e  via hetM  to estimate Eve’s 
quadratures , ,,E j E jx p  from his noisy jx ¢  and jp ¢ . Eve’s quadratures can be expressed as follows 
[1]: 
( )
( ), ,
, ,
, ,
, ,
,
.
E j E j
E j E j
B B
E j E j x x
B B
E j E j p p
x x e e
p p e e
= - +
= - +
                                  (142) 
Without loss of generality, assuming that the estimators 
, ,
,
E j E j
B B
x p
e e  have variances 
( )( )
0
2 2 21
i ill
F T ws s+å  , the conditional variances 
, ,
2ˆ B
E j xE j
x e
s  and 
, ,
2ˆ B
E j pE j
p e
s  are precisely ex-
pressed as 
( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( )
( )( )( )
( )( )( )
2
,
2
,, ,
22 2 21
0
2 2 210
0
2 2 21
0
2 2 21
0
2
2 2
, ,
12 2 21
0
1
0
ˆ
,
j E j
B
E jE j jxE j
i ill
i ill
i ill
i ill
x xB
E j E jxx e x
F T
i ill F T
F T
F T
x e x
F T N
N
w
w
w
w
s s
w s s
s s
s s
s
s s
¢
¢
+ -
+ +H
H + +
+ +H
= - = -
æ ö÷ç å ÷ç ÷= + -ç ÷ç ÷ç å ÷÷çè ø
å= å
å 




 


        (143) 
and 
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( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( )
( )( )( )
( )( )( )
2
,
2
,, ,
22 2 21
0
2 2 21 10
0
2 2 21
2
0 0
22 2 21
,0 ,
2
2 2
, ,
12 2 21
0
0 ˆ1
ˆ
,
j E j
B
E jE j jpE j
i ill
i ill
i ill
x ei ill E j xE j
p pB
E j E jpp e p
F T
i ill F T
F T N
F T
p e p
F T N
N
w
w
w
w
s s
w s s
s s
ss s
s
s s
H
¢
¢
+ -
+ +
+ +H
H + +
= - = -
æ ö÷ç å ÷ç ÷= + -ç ÷ç ÷ç å ÷÷çè ø
å= =å
å 




 


  (144)                     
where 
2
2
1 B
B
T
T
-H = , and 2BT  is the transmittance of Bob’s internal beam splitter, used for the 
separation of the quadratures. The related commutation relations at hetM  are  
, ,, , 0j j E j E jx p x pé ù é ù¢ ¢ = =ë û ë û ,                                      (145) 
, ,
, ,
E j E j
B B
j j j jx p
x e p e x pé ù é ù¢ ¢ ¢ ¢- - = -ê ú ë ûë û .                               (146) 
Specifically, the hetM  leads to a covariance matrix , ,j j j jx p x p¢ ¢K  as [2] 
( ), ,j j j jx p x p I¢ ¢ =K K .                                     (147) 
Precisely, for Eve’s system jE , the corresponding covariance matrix is 
( ),j j jE x p I=K K .                                       (148) 
In particular, assuming that ( )( ) 210 1i ill F T< <å   for the l Gaussian sub-channels i , 
and 
0
2 1ws   holds, the following symplectic spectra [2] can be constructed for Bob’s system: 
( )( )( )
0
2 21
j jx p i ill
F T ws¢ ¢ = å  ,                                 (149) 
( )2, , ˆ ,j j j j j jx p x p B As¢ ¢ =                                        (150) 
and for Eve’s system the symplectic spectra is 
( )( )( )( )
0
2 21 11 ,
jE i i il ll l
F T Wws= - å å  .                        (151) 
Precisely, in case of reverse reconciliation and hetM , ,j i jE x p¢ ¢  is as follows: 
( )( ) ( )( )( )21 2 21 1, ˆ1 ,1 .j j j j ji ill i iE x p B AllF T F T s¢ ¢
æ ö÷ç ÷= - +ç ÷ç ÷çè øå å               (152)                    
Particularly, for the joint system 
j jB E
r  of Bob and Eve, the , ,,j j j jx E p E¢ ¢   symplectic spectra are  
( )
0
2
, , ,1,1j j jx p E ws¢ ¢ = .                                         (153) 
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Without loss of generality, using the related covariance matrices of (147)–(148), symplectic spec-
tra of (125) and (149)–(153), the ( ):A Bc  and ( ):I B E  functions, the het,RR Mone wayS -  asymptotic 
secret key rate for the RR, hetM , AMQD modulation in one-way CVQKD, from (37) is precisely 
as follows: 
( ) ( )
( )( )( )
het
21
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
,
1
2
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 1 1
2 22 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
2 22 2 2 2
: :
log
log log
log log .
i ill
B A B A B A B Aj j j j j j j j
i i i il l l ll l l l
RR M
one way
F T
W W W W
S A B I B E
s s s s
c-
-
+ + - -
+ + - -
= -
= å
æ ö÷ç ÷ç- - ÷ç ÷÷çè ø
æ öå å å å ÷ç- - ÷ç ÷çè ø

                  (154) 
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3.1.4  Heterodyne Measurement, Direct Reconciliation 
3.1.4.1  Private classical capacity of a Gaussian sub-channel 
Without loss of generality, using a slightly modified version of the related formulas of Section 
2.2.1, the ( )DR iP   private classical capacity of i  can be derived from (75). 
3.1.4.2  Secret key rate 
In case of hetM  and DR, Alice uses 
, ,
,
E j E j
A A
x p
e e  to estimate Eve’s quadratures , ,,E j E jx p  from her 
jx  and jp . Using the differences of ( )
,
,
E j
A
E j x
x e-  and  ( )
,
,
E j
A
E j p
p e- , Eve’s quadratures are [1] 
( )
( ), ,
, ,
, ,
, ,
,
.
E j E j
E j E j
A A
E j E j x x
A A
E j E j p p
x x e e
p p e e
= - +
= - +
                                 (155) 
Specifically, the variances of 
, ,
2ˆ A
E j xE j
x e
s  and 
, ,
2ˆ A
E j pE j
p e
s  are as follows: 
( )
,, ,
2
,
2
2
2
,
2
,
ˆ
,
A
E jE j xE j
j E j
j
A
E j xx e
x x
E j x
x e
x
s = -
= -
                                (156) 
and 
( )
,, ,
2
,
2
2
0
2
,
,
2
2
,
2
,
ˆ
ˆ
.
A
E jE j pE j
j E j
j
Ax eE j xE j
A
E j pp e
p p
E j p
N
p e
p
s
s = -
= -
=
                                  (157) 
Particularly, the corresponding commutation relations are  
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, ,, , 0j j E j E jx p x pé ù é ù= =ë û ë û ,                                    (158) 
and 
, ,
, ,
E j E j
A A
j j j jx p
x e p e x pé ù é ù- - = -ê ú ë ûë û .                             (159) 
Eve’s corresponding covariance matrix is 
( ),j j jE x p I=K K .                                      (160) 
The symplectic spectra ,j i jE x p  is evaluated as follows: 
( )2, ˆ ,1j i j j jE x p B As= .                                   (161) 
In particular, using the covariance matrices of (147)–(148), symplectic spectra of (125), (149)–
(151), and (161), the Holevo quantities of ( ):A Bc  and ( ):A Ec  are determined, from which 
the het,DR Mone wayS -  asymptotic secret key rate for the DR, hetM , AMQD modulation in one-way 
CVQKD is precisely as follows: 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )( )
het
21
21
1 1 1 1
,
2
1
1 1 1 1
2 22 2 2 2
: :
log
log log .
i ill
i ill
i i i il l l ll l l l
DR M
one way
F T
F T
W W W W
S A B A Ec c-
-
+ + - -
= -
å= å
æ öå å å å ÷ç- - ÷ç ÷çè ø


                    (162) 
■ 
The derivation of the AMQD secret key rates for two-way CVQKD is included in the Appendix. 
 
 
3.2  SVD-Assisted AMQD 
The SVD-assisted AMQD modulation [6] leads to a virtually improved modulation variance 
( )2 2 21 cw w ws s s¢¢ = + > ,                                         (163) 
where 0c >  for the subcarrier transmission, for further details and analysis see [6]. The SVD 
defines a logical layer above the physical layer of the multicarrier transmission, and the virtual 
increment of the multicarrier modulation variance from 2ws ¢¢  to 2ws  in (164) is precisely analogous 
to a decrease in Eve’s transmittance ( ) ( )2 2, ,Eve i Eve iF T F T¢ <  at a constant multicarrier modu-
lation variance 2ws , which after some calculations yields the following: 
( ) ( )( )2 2, ,1 1 ,Eve i i Eve iF T F Tu¢ = - -                         (165) 
where ( )( )2 1,1
i
Eve iF T u- < , and 1iu >  is expressed as 
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( )( )( )
2
2
2 2
min
22
max
max
,
i
i
Eve i
n
Eve i i
i
i
F T
w
w
s
s
n s l
n s
u ¢¢
"
æ ö÷ç ÷-ç ÷ç ÷è ø
-
=
= 
 
                                (166) 
where ( )( )
min
22max maxi i in i
F Tl
"
>   is precisely the largest eigenvalue of ( ) ( )†F FT T  [6],  
( ) ( )† 12 2TF F U U-= GGT T ,                                   (167) 
and where TG  is the transpose of G  (e.g., elements of the SVD of ( )F T ). For further details, see 
[6]. In particular, the SVD-assisted rate formulas can be computed by the previously obtained 
AMQD secret key rate formulas, using the following for the transmittance of the i  Gaussian 
sub-channels, without loss of generality, as 
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )( )
2 2
min
22
2 21 1
21 1
max
21
max
.
Eve i
n
Eve i i
i
i i i i il l
l l
i i il l
l l
i il F Tl
F T F T
F T
F T
n s l
n s
u
u
"
æ ö÷ç ÷-ç ÷ç ÷è ø
-
¢ =
= ⋅
=
å å
å å
å 
 
 


                (168) 
For simplicity, we do not repeat these formulas here. 
■ 
Since for all formulas above ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )2 2 21 1
1
l
i i i i i il l
l i
F T F T T
=
¢ > >å å    at a given 
single-carrier modulation variance 
0
2
ws , the proof is concluded.   
■ 
 
3.3  AMQD-MQA Secret Key Rates 
In this section, we derive the private classical capacity regions of users 1U  and 2U  and the corre-
sponding secret key rates in an AMQD-MQA multiuser scenario. First, we have to summarize the 
derivation of the classical capacity region of the users, from [5]. 
 
Theorem 2 (AMQD-MQA secret key rates). The AMQD-MQA leads to improved secret key 
rates in a K K  multiuser CVQKD scenario in comparison to a single-carrier K K  mul-
tiuser CVQKD scenario. 
 
Proof. 
The proof assumes two users, kU , 1,2.k =  Let l be the number of good i  Gaussian sub-
channels. (i.e., the noise of the sub-channels is below the critical security parameter Even , which 
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identifies the optimal Gaussian collective attack, see the properties of AMQD and AMQD-MQA 
in [4] and [5]). Let the transmittance of the i-th sub-channel be ( )i iT Î  . 
The outputs of 1U  and 2U  are expressed as follows: 
( )( ) ( ),  1,2. k ky F T z F k= + D =                            (169) 
Specifically, the output d-dimensional output of the k-th user is 
( )( ) ( ),k kF F= + Dy T z                                    (170) 
where ( ) ( ) ( ),1 ,, , Tk k dT Té ù= ë ûT    , ( ) ( ),1 ,, , 0, kTk k k dz zé ù= Îë û zz K   , and kzK  is the 
covariance matrix of the zero-mean, circular symmetric Gaussian random vector ( )0,
kk
Î zz K  
of kU .  
In particular, the sum capacity [5] is the total throughput over the l sub-channels of   at a con-
stant modulation variance 2ws  is as follows:  
( ) ( )
( )( )
1 2
22
2
sum 1 2,
2
max
max log 1 .
i ii
R R
F T
li
C R R
ws
s
Î
"
= +
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= + ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øå 


C
                             (171) 
The symmetric capacity [5] is the maximum common rate at which both 1U  and 2U  can reliably 
transmit information over the l sub-channels of  , as follows: 
( ) ( )
( )( ) 22
2
sym sym
1
sym sym 22,
max max log 1 ,
i ii
F T
liR R
C R w
s
s"Î
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= = + ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øå 

C
            (172) 
where symR  is the rate at which both 1U  and 2U  can simultaneously communicate in a reliable 
form. 
In particular, for K users 1, KU U , the sum capacity and the symmetric capacity of   are ex-
pressed as  
( ) ( )
( )( ) 22
2
1
sum 2, ,
max max log 1 ,
i ii
K
F T
iK lR R i
C R w
s
sÎ "
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= = + ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øå å 

C
             (173) 
and 
( ) ( )
( )( ) 22
2
sym sym
1
sym sym 2
, ,
max max log 1
i ii
F T
lK iR R
C R w
s
s"Î
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= = + ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øå 

C
.            (174) 
The C  capacity region [5] is the region of the rates of ( )1 2,R R  of 1U  and 2U , at which both 
users can have a simultaneous reliable communication over the quantum channel  . The region 
C  upper bounds the independent single transmission rates as of 1U  and 2U , which can be maxi-
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mized if all the l sub-channels with a total constraint 2l ws  (i.e., all degrees of freedom) are dedi-
cated to user k, as follows: 
( )( ) 22
22max log 1 ,  1, ,
i ii
F T
k li
R k Kw
s
s"
æ ö÷ç ÷ç£ + =÷ç ÷ç ÷è øå 

.                      (175) 
Particularly, if the equality holds, then only user kU  is allowed to transmit over the l sub-
channels. These rates define the corner points ( )11 1
max
R
C R
Î
=

 and ( )22 2
max
R
C R
Î
=

 of 1U  and 2U . 
At the corner points, the rate of the given user is maximal whereas rate of the other user is zero. 
On the line between the corner points, both users are allowed to simultaneously communicate at 
rates 1R  and 2R .         
Hence, in the corner points 1C , 2C , only 1U , 2U  is allowed to transmit over the l sub-channels, 
whereas the rate of the other user is zero. Taking the   convex hull of all possible independent 
input distributions leads to the capacity region C  as 
( )
1 2
1 2
,
,
z z
z z
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷çè øC = C .                              (176) 
The inputs 1z  and 2z  are zero-mean Gaussian random variables, for which follows that all infor-
mation quantities that characterize capacity region C  are simultaneously maximized because the 
capacity region ( ), C    with zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian random distri-
bution variables formulates the superset S  of all other capacity regions (for the proof of optimal-
ity, see [5]) with arbitrary xp ¢  distributions, that is,  
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
1 2
,
, S , S ,
x x
x x
p p x x
p p x x
¢ ¢
¢ ¢
¢ ¢" "
æ ö æ ö÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç ¢ ¢= =÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç çè ø è ø
      C C C .               (177) 
As follows, for the ( )20,k kz zé ùÎ ê úë û   inputs, one obtains the capacity region C : 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )1
2
MQA 1 2 1 2
MQA 2 1 2 1
: max : ,
: max : ,
x
x
I z y z I x y x
I z y z I x y x
¢"
¢"
¢ ¢=
¢ ¢=                       (178) 
where ( )MQAI ⋅  is the corresponding correlation measure function between Alice and Bob (e.g., 
the ( ):I A B  mutual information or the Holevo information ( ):A Bc , depending on the attrib-
utes of the actual CVQKD protocol) and 
( ) ( )
1 2
MQA 1 2 1 2,
, : max , :
x x
I z z y I x x y¢ ¢"
¢ ¢= .                            (179) 
Particularly, for l independent ( )20,
i
i d
d sÎ   subcarriers, 
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( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
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                 (180) 
where ( )diffH ⋅  is the differential entropy. For a CV variable x  with probability density function 
xF , the differential entropy is evaluated as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1diff 2log d .xx F uH x F u u¥-¥= ò                             (181) 
The conditional differential entropy, at given output y is 
                       ( ) ( ) ( )1diff , 2, log d d .x yx y F u vH x y F u v u v
¥
-¥
æ ö÷ç= ÷ç ÷çè øò                     (182) 
From these quantities, the continuous mutual information function is 
( ) ( ) ( )diff diff:I x y H x H x y= - ,                                (183) 
and 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )diff diff diff diff diff,H F H F H F H F H= + £ +d y d y d d y .   (184) 
(Note: If the l Gaussian subcarriers are not completely mutually independent, then £  stands in 
the second line of (180), whereas if the l subcarriers are derived from not the optimal zero-mean 
circular symmetric complex Gaussian random   distribution, then £  stands in the third line of 
(180).) 
The input maximization leads to the following sum capacity in an AMQD-MQA setting: 
( ) ( )( )
22
2sum 2max log 1
i ii
F T
li
C w
s
s"
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= + ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øå 
 ,                  (185) 
where ( )( ) ( )2 21 1i i i il ll lF T T>å å  , with a total transmit variance constraint 
2 2 21 ,  0
i ill ww ws s s= ³å .                                  (186) 
Hence, for the l sub-channels with a constant nonzero modulation variance 2 0
iws > , 
0
2 2 ,w ws s<                                            (187) 
where 
0
2
ws  is the modulation variance of the ,j jx p  quadratures of iz  (i.e., single-carrier modula-
tion variance, see Section 2.1.1). 
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In particular, for two users, 1U  and 2U , the C  capacity region ( )1 2,R R  of AMQD-MQA is as 
follows: 
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
1 MQA 1 2 MQA 1 2
2 MQA 2 1 MQA 2 1
: , : , ,
: , : , ,
R I z y F T z I z y F T z
R I z y F T z I z y F T z
£ =
£ =
 
                (188) 
and 
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )1 2 MQA 1 2 MQA 1 2, : , , : .R R I z z y F T I z z y F T+ £ =     (189) 
Particularly, for user kU , 
( )( ) 22
2
MQA
2max log 1 ,  1,
i ii
F T
k li
R k Kw
s
s"
æ ö÷ç ÷ç£ + Î÷ç ÷ç ÷è øå 

,             (190) 
the sum rate (the overall throughput rate of the users) MQAsumR  is calculated as, 
( )( ) 22
2
MQA MQA
sum 2max log 1 ,
i ii
F T
kK li
R R w
s
s"
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= £ + ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øå å 

                  (191) 
and the symmetric rate (the common rate at which all users can have a simultaneous reliable 
communication) MQAsymR  is calculated as 
( )( ) 22
2
MQA 1
sym 2max log 1
i ii
F T
lK i
R w
s
s"
æ ö÷ç ÷ç£ + ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øå 

.                       (192) 
For K users 1, KU U , from the results of (190) and (191) trivially follows MQAkR  and MQAsymR . 
The results on the C  capacity region of ( )1 2,R R  of 1U  and 2U  in AMQD-MQA are summarized 
as follows. The corner points 1C  and 2C  identify the maximal rates at with a single user can 
communicate. The line between the two corner points represents that trade-off between the rates 
of users 1U  and 2U , at which simultaneously reliable transmission is possible. The transmission is 
realized through l subcarriers, each having a constant modulation variance 2ws  per subcarrier 
quadrature components. The two users communicate over the Gaussian quantum channel with 
rates 1R  and 2R . At the corner points 1C  and 2C , only one user is allowed to transmit and all 
degrees of freedom is allocated to that user.  
Specifically, from the derivation of the C  classical capacity region, the private classical capacity 
region P  is derived as follows. In particular, the private classical capacity region P  is precisely 
defined as 
( )
1 2
1 2
,
,
z z
z z
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷çè øP = P ,                                    (193) 
where 
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( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
1 2
,
, S , S ,
x x
x x
p p x x
p p x x
¢ ¢
¢ ¢
¢ ¢" "
æ ö æ ö÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç ¢ ¢= =÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç çè ø è ø
      P P P .                (194) 
For two users, 1U  and 2U , the P  region of secret key rates ( )1 2,S S  of AMQD-MQA is as fol-
lows: 
( )( )( ) ( )
( )( )( ) ( )
( )( )( ) ( )
( )( )( ) ( )
1 MQA 1 2 MQA 1
MQA 1 2 MQA 1
2 MQA 2 1 MQA 2
MQA 2 1 MQA 2
: , :
: , : ,
: , :
: , : ,
S I z y F T z I y E
I z y F T z I y E
S I z y F T z I y E
I z y F T z I y E
£ -
= -
£ -
= -




                   (195) 
where ( )MQAI ⋅  is the related correlation measure function at an optimal Gaussian collective at-
tack between Bob and Eve, or Alice and Eve (e.g., ( ):I B E , ( ):B Ec  or ( ):I A E , ( ):A Ec  
depending on the direction of the reconciliation and the measurement type of the actual CVQKD 
protocol), kE  is Eve’s variable in the attacking of user’s kU  transmission, and 
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 MQA 1 2 MQA 1 MQA 2MQA 1 2 MQA 1 MQA 2
, : , : :
, : : : .
S S I z z y F T I y E I y E
I z z y F T I y E I y E
+ £ - +
= - +

        (196) 
Thus, for a single user kU , the secret key rate 
MQA
kS  is precisely 
( )( ) ( )
22
2
MQA
2 MQAmax log 1 : ,  1,
i ii
F T
k kli
S I y E k Kw
s
s"
æ æ ö ö÷ ÷ç ç ÷ ÷ç ç£ + - Î÷ ÷ç ç ÷ ÷ç ç ÷ ÷è è ø øå 

.        (197) 
Specifically, for K users, the sum secret key rate (the overall secret key rate throughput of the 
users) MQAsumS  is precisely calculated as 
( )( ) ( )
22
2
MQA MQA
sum 2 MQAmax log 1 : ,
i ii
F T
k kK li K
S S I y Ew
s
s"
æ æ ö ö÷ ÷ç ç ÷ ÷ç ç= £ + -÷ ÷ç ç ÷ ÷ç ç ÷ ÷è è ø øå å å
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      (198) 
where ( )MQA : kK I y Eå  is the amount of the eavesdropped information of the K users, quanti-
fied by ( ):I B E , ( ):B Ec  or ( ):I A E , ( ):A Ec  functions for each kU , depending on the 
attributes of the CVQKD protocol. 
The symmetric secret key rate (the common rate at which all K users can have a reliable simul-
taneous secret communication) MQAsymS  is calculated as 
( )( ) ( )
22
2
MQA 1
sym 2 MQAmax log 1 :
i ii
F T
klK i K
S I y Ew
s
s"
æ æ æ ö öö÷ ÷÷ç ç ç ÷ ÷÷ç ç ç£ + -÷ ÷÷ç ç ç ÷ ÷÷ç ç ç ÷ ÷÷è è è ø øøå å

.            (199) 
For K users 1, KU U , the ( )sumP   sum private classical capacity and the ( )symP   symmetric 
private classical capacity of   are precisely expressed as  
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where *2
i
s  was shown in (69), and for ( )symP  , 
( ) ( )
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       (201) 
Particularly, the AMQD-MQA secret key rates 1S  and 2S  of users 1U  and 2U  are the corre-
sponding secret key rates obtained in Sections 3.1–3.2.  
Specifically, the corner points are the kP  private classical capacities, for 1U  and 2U  evaluated as  
( )( )1 1 1 MQA 1max max : ,
i i
P S R I y E
r r" "
= = -                           (202) 
and 
( )( )2 2 2 MQA 2max max : ,
i i
P S R I y E
r r" "
= = -                           (203) 
where kR  is the rate of classical communication of user kU —see (190)—measured by either the 
( ): kI A B  or ( ): kA Bc  between A (Alice) and the k-th Bob, kB , while ( )MQA : kI y E  is Eve’s 
classical communication rate, quantified by ( ): kI B E , ( ): kB Ec  or ( ): kI A E , ( ): kA Ec , 
respectively. 
■ 
 
3.4  SVD-Assisted AMQD-MQA Secret Key Rates 
The SVD-assisted AMQD-MQA secret key rates 1S ¢  and 2S ¢  of users 1U  and 2U  are the related 
secret key rates obtained in Section 3.3 and in the Appendix.  
The corresponding transmission rates are evaluated as follows: 
( ) ( )( )
22
2sum 2max log 1 ,
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F T
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s
s
¢¢
"
æ ö÷ç ÷¢ ç= + ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øå 
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( ) ( )( )
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                          (205) 
thus 
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where 
( ) ( )MQA MQA: : ,k k
K K
I y E I y E¢ £å å                           (208)                 
which precisely follows from (165). Particularly, for K users 1, KU U , the sum private classical 
( )sumP ¢   and symmetric private classical ( )symP ¢   capacities in the SVD-assisted AMQD-
MQA are expressed precisely as  
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where *2
i
s  was shown in (69). Thus for any 1iu > , without loss of generality, 
 ( ) ( )sum sumP P¢ >  ,                                  (210) 
which follows from (168) for i , since 
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i
i i i i i iF T F T F T
w
w
s
s
¢¢¢ = >                    (211) 
In particular, the ( )symP ¢   SVD-assisted symmetric private classical capacity is precisely as 
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where for any 1iu > , without loss of generality, 
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( ) ( )sym symP P¢ >  .                                       (213) 
The kP ¢  corner point coincidences to the private classical capacity of user kU :  
( )( )1 1 1 MQA 1max max :
i i
P S R I y E
r r" "
¢ ¢ ¢= = -                          (214) 
and 
( )( )2 2 2 MQA 2max max : ,
i i
P S R I y E
r r" "
¢ ¢ ¢= = -                         (215) 
where kR  is the rate of classical communication between Alice and Bob k , measured by either 
the ( ): kI A B  or ( ): kA Bc , while ( ) ( )MQA MQA: :k kI y E I y E¢ <  is the SVD-assisted rate of 
Eve, quantified by ( ): kI B E ¢ , ( ): kB Ec ¢  or ( ): kI A E ¢ , ( ): kA Ec ¢  (see Section 3.3). 
The AMQD-MQA secret key rate ratios for users 1U  and 2U  are depicted in Figure 2. The classi-
cal and the private classical capacity regions are denoted by C  and P . The 1S  and 2S  represent 
the ratio of the corresponding secret key formulas, precisely hom,RR Mone wayR - , het
,RR M
one wayR - , hom
,RR M
two wayR - , or 
het,RR M
two wayR -  between users 1U  and 2U , obtained in Section 3.1–3.3, depending on the actual setting 
of AMQD-MQA. 
 
 
Figure 2. The P  private classical capacity region of AMQD-MQA (a) and of SVD-assisted 
AMQD-MQA (b). 
 
The SVD-assistance leads to an improved ( ): kI A B¢  or ( ): kA Bc¢  between Alice and Bob. See 
(165). In particular, this enhancement, overall, results in an increased secret key rates 1S ¢  and 2S ¢  
for users 1U  and 2U . 
■ 
These results conclude the proof of Theorem 2. 
■ 
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4  Physical Boundaries of an Optimal Gaussian Attack  
Theorem 3 (Tolerable excess noise of AMQD). The AMQD leads to an improved amount of 
tolerable excess noise in comparison to single-carrier CVQKD. 
 
Proof. 
As we have seen in Section 3, from the variance 2sC  of the Gaussian link, the excess noise is 
evaluated as 
( ) ( )( )
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,
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,
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1
i Eve il ll l
Eve ill
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F T
N s s -C -
å å= - = å ,                               (216) 
where 2s  is the vacuum noise. From [1–3] for the RR of AMQD, the following inequalities bring 
up for the , .,
RR coh
tol AMQDN  maximum tolerable excess noise, in a coherent state transmission: 
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Thus from (216), 
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(218) 
Thus, for squeezed states [1–3], the tolerable excess noise is precisely as follows: 
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      (219) 
Specifically, the inequality of (219) can be sharpened for the RR AMQD settings as follows. Using 
coherent states for the transmission, the upper bound on the ,tol AMQDN  tolerable excess noise in 
an AMQD modulation in one-way CVQKD, for the case of RR, is as follows.  
In particular, the upper bound on the tolerable excess noise, ,,
RR one way
tol singleN
- , is precisely evaluated 
as [3] 
, ,
, ,
RR one way RR one way
tol AMQD tol singleN Na- -= ,                                   (220) 
where 1a > , and 
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( )2, 1 16, 2 1 1 0.39RR one waytol single eN - = + - » ,                             (221) 
thus 
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where 0RRc >  is a constant, expressed precisely as 
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From a security argument linked to the entangling cloning attack [1], the following upper bound 
can be derived for the maximal tolerable excess noise for the DR of AMQD: 
( )( ) 21
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F T
N < - å  .                                    (224) 
Without loss of generality, the inequality of  can be sharpened for the DR AMQD settings as 
follows [3]: 
, ,
, , 0.8 ,
DR one way DR one way DR
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where 1b > , and  
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where 0DRc >  is a constant, expressed precisely as 
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The result in  follows from the following equation [3]: 
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for some 0Ã > . 
In particular, for two-way CVQKD, these upper bounds change as follows: 
, , ,
, , , 0.8,
RR two way RR two way DR one way
tol AMQD tol single tol singleN N Na a a- - -¢ ¢ ¢= » »                   (230) 
and 
, ,
, , 0.75.
DR two way DR two way
tol AMQD tol singleN Nb b- -¢ ¢= »                             (231) 
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Without loss of generality, the improvement in the tolerable excess noise can be approached by 
the ratio 1k ³  between the excess noise ( )( )2 21 1single Eve EveN W T T= - -  and AMQDN  as 
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 21
,
2 21 1
,
22 2 1
,
2 221 1 1
, ,
22 2 1
,
221 1
,
1 1
1 1
1
1
1
1
.
single
AMQD
Eve Eve ill
Eve i Eve il ll l
Eve Eve Eve ill
i Eve i Eve Eve il l ll l l
Eve Eve Eve ill
i Eve il ll l
N
N
W T F T
T W F T
W T T F T
W F T T F T
W T T F T
W T F T
k
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
-
=
å= å å
å= å å å
å= å å
                        (232)                     
In a precise form, the maximal amount of tolerable excess noise ,,
RR one way
tol AMQDN
- , ,,
DR one way
tol AMQDN
-  and 
,
,
RR two way
tol AMQDN
- , ,,
DR two way
tol AMQDN
-  in an AMQD modulation is determined at zero secret key rates [1-3]. 
At a homodyne measurement homM , the tolerable excess noise is derived at 
hom homhom hom
, ,, , 0,RR M RR MRR M DR Mone way one way two way two wayS S S S- - - -= = = =                       (233) 
while for the heterodyne measurement hetM , it is determined from 
het hethet het
, ,, , 0.RR M RR MRR M DR Mone way one way two way two wayS S S S- - - -= = = =                       (234) 
For the corresponding rate formulas, see Section 3.  
The results are summarized in Figure 3. The tolerable excess noise is , ,tol AMQD tol singleN Nc= , 
where 1single AMQDx x N Nc k= = ³  and 1AMQD singleN N x£ £ . 
 
 
Figure 3. Tolerable excess noise as a function of channel transmittance in an AMQD modulation 
with homodyne (a) and heterodyne measurements (b). Abbreviations: DR – Direct Reconciliation, 
RR – Reverse Reconciliation. 
 
Specifically, the additional degree of freedom injected by SVD into the transmission leads to an 
increased tolerable excess noise, as 
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( )
( ) ( )( )
21
,
21 1
,
1
1
Eve ill
i Eve il ll l
F TSVD
AMQD
W F T
N
¢-
¢-
å= å å ,                                (235) 
where  
( ) ( )2 21 1, ,Eve i Eve il ll lF T F T¢ <å å ,                            (236) 
thus  
, ,
SVD
tol AMQD tol singleN Nc> M ,                                   (237) 
where 1M > . In particular, the improvement in the amount of tolerable excess noise is present 
more significantly in two-way CVQKD, since the multicarrier-based transmission enhances the 
rates of private classical communication for each channel uses, 1  and 2 , between Alice to 
Bob.    
The physically allowed 1 ill Wå  variances of an optimal Gaussian collective attack as a function 
of ( )( ) 21 i ill F Tå   of the l Gaussian sub-channels i  are depicted in Figure 4. Specifically, 
the upper bounds on the 1 ill Wå  variances reveal those physical boundaries at which a non-zero 
secret rate is possible through a noisy Gaussian quantum link  . Precisely, by exceeding these 
physical boundaries on the variance of Eve’s EPR state, no secret transmission is possible be-
tween the legal parties; thus Eve’s variance W  is restricted to the range of 10 i illW W< £ å .  
 
 
Figure 4. The physical boundaries of Eve’s variance in an optimal Gaussian attack in AMQD 
modulation for homodyne (a) and heterodyne measurements (b). Abbreviations: DR – Direct 
Reconciliation, RR – Reverse Reconciliation. 
 
Particularly, the boundaries on 1 ill Wå  confirm that AMQD tolerates higher amounts of excess 
noise in case of homM , in comparison to hetM .  
■ 
 
 
 40
5  Conclusions 
The multicarrier CVQKD extends the possibilities of current, standard single-carrier CVQKD. 
We studied the security thresholds of multicarrier CVQKD, through AMQD modulation, and its 
extended SVD-assisted version. The results have also been extended to a multiuser environment, 
through the analysis of AMQD-MQA. We proved the secret key rate formulas of multicarrier 
CVQKD and determined the security parameters of the transmission. We investigated the private 
classical capacity of a Gaussian sub-channel and characterized the private classical capacity do-
main. The physical boundaries of optimal Gaussian attacks against multicarrier transmission have 
also been revealed, along with the maximal tolerable variance parameters. The results revealed 
that multicarrier CVQKD provides a considerably improved framework for the experimental im-
plementation of an unconditionally secure communication over standard telecommunication net-
works. 
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Supplemental Information 
S.1  Homodyne and Heterodyne Measurements 
In a homodyne measurement homM , only one quadrature, the position or the momentum quadra-
ture is measured. The variances of Alice’s quadratures are 
0
2 2
jx ws=  and 0
2 2
jp ws= . Bob’s 
quadratures have variances ( )( )
0
22 2 2 21
j j i ill
x p F T ws s¢ ¢= = +å  , where 
( )( ) 21 i ill F Tå   is the Fourier transformed transmittance of  , while 2s  is the noise vari-
ance of  . The systems of Alice and Eve are modeled as independent coherent states, and using 
the estimator operators 
jx
e ¢  and jpe ¢  on Alice’s side, the following relations hold for the estimation 
of Bob’s noisy quadrature jx ¢  from jx : 
,j jx A x j
e xe¢ = ,                                Equation Section (Next)(S.1) 
where  
2, ,
j j
j j
x x
A x x
e ¢=                                             (S.2) 
( ) 2222 2ˆ j jjj x jj x xj x jx e xx e xs ¢ ¢¢¢ ¢ ¢= - = - ,                            (S.3) 
and 
,j jp A p j
e pe¢ =                                              (S.4) 
2, ,
j j
j j
p p
A p p
e ¢=                                              (S.5) 
( ) 2222 2ˆ j jjj p jj p pj p jp e pp e ps ¢ ¢¢¢ ¢ ¢= - = - .                          (S.6) 
From the estimators 
jx
e ¢ , jpe ¢  and the differences of ( )jj xx e ¢¢ - , ( )jj pp e ¢¢ - , Bob’s quadratures jx ¢  
and jp¢  can be expressed as follows: 
( )
( )
,
.
j j
j j
j j x x
j j p p
x x e e
p p e e
¢ ¢
¢ ¢
¢ ¢= - +
¢ ¢= - +                                        (S.7) 
For these quantities, the following inequalities hold 
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( )( )( ) ( )( )
2
2
2 2
0 0
2 2 210 0
0
2 2 2 2
0
22 2 21 ,
j
j
i ill
x
j j j j p
N
i ill F T
x x x x N
F T w
w
s
w w s s
s s s
¢
+
¢ ¢£ -
= + - åå  
          (S.8) 
and 
( )( )( ) ( )( )
2
2
2 2
0 0
2 2 210 0
0
2 2 2 2
0
22 2 21 .
j
j
i ill
p
j j j j x
N
i ill F T
p p p p N
F T w
w
s
w w s s
s s s
¢
+
¢ ¢£ -
= + - åå  
       (S.9) 
In case of heterodyne measurement hetM , both of the position and momentum quadratures are 
measured. Alice has both of the estimators 
jx
e ¢  and jpe ¢  from the measurement, thus both quadra-
tures are known for Alice. The commutation relations for Alice’s quadrature pair ( ),j jx p  are  
, , 0j j j jx p x pé ù é ù¢ ¢= =ë û ë û ,                                     (S.10) 
, ,
j jj x j p j j
x e p e x p¢ ¢é ù é ù- - = -ê ú ë ûë û .                              (S.11) 
Assuming that the estimators have variances ( )( )
0
22 2 2 21
j j
i ix p ll
e e F T ws s¢ ¢= = +å  , the 
conditional variances 2ˆ
j x j
x e
s
¢¢  and 
2ˆ
j pj
p e
s
¢¢  are reevaluated as follows: 
( )
( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )
( )( )( )
( )( )
2
2
22 2 21
0
2 2 210
0
2 2 21
0
2 2 21
0
2
2 2
12 2 21
0
1
0
ˆ
,
j j
jj x jj
i ill
i ill
i ill
i ill
x x
j x jx e x
F T
i ill F T
F T
F T
x e x
F T N
N
w
w
w
w
s s
w s s
s s
s s
s
s s
¢
¢
¢¢
+ -
+ +H
H + +
+ +H
¢ ¢= - = -
æ ö÷ç å ÷ç ÷= + -ç ÷ç ÷ç å ÷÷çè ø
å= å
å 




 


        (S.12) 
and 
( )
( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )
( )( )
( )( )( )
2
2
22 2 21
0
2 2 21 10
0
2 2 21 2
0 0
22 2 21
0
2
2 2
12 2 21
0
0 ˆ1
ˆ
,
j j
jj p jj
i ill
i ill
i ill
x ei ill j x j
p p
j p jp e p
F T
i ill F T
F T N
F T
p e p
F T N
N
w
w
w
w
s s
w s s
s s
ss s
s
s s
¢
H
¢ ¢
¢
¢¢
+ -
+ +
+ +H
H + +
¢ ¢= - = -
æ ö÷ç å ÷ç ÷= + -ç ÷ç ÷ç å ÷÷çè ø
å= =å
å 




 


      (S.13) 
where 
2
2
1 A
A
T
T
-H = ,                                                 (S.14) 
and where 2AT  is the transmittance of Alice’s internal beam splitter used for the separation of 
the quadratures. 
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S.2  AMQD Secret Key Rates in Two-Way CVQKD 
In case of the two-way CVQKD, Bob starts the communication by sending via AMQD modula-
tion a quantum system to Alice, who adds her internal secret to the received system, which is 
then sent back via AMQD modulation to Bob. We use the formalisms of [2] throughout to derive 
the security parameters. 
The corresponding covariance matrix 
Bi
rK  of the density matrix iBr  of the noisy Gaussian sub-
carrier CV ii i ix pf¢¢ ¢¢ ¢¢= +  , where if¢¢  refers to a Gaussian subcarrier CV if  which is af-
fected by the two channel uses, specifically by 1  and 2 , is precisely 
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
222 2
22 2
1
,
1
Bi
i
i i
i i B
I F T Z
F T Z
w w
r
w
s s
s l
æ æ ö ö÷ ÷ç ç - ÷ ÷ç ç ÷ ÷ç ç ÷ ÷è øç ÷= ç ÷ç ÷æ ö ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç - ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ ÷çè è ø ø
K


     (S.15)                     
where 
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )
22 22
2 2
1
.
iB i i i i i
i i
F T F T W I
F T I
w
w
l s
s
æ æ ö ö÷ ÷ç ç ÷ ÷= + -ç ç ÷ ÷ç ç ÷ ÷ç çè è ø ø
+
 

              (S.16)                     
Particularly, the covariance matrix 
Ei
rK  of Eve’s density matrix iEr  is precisely evaluated as [2]  
2 0
0
,
0 0
i i
Ei
i
iE A
i i
E i
i i
I Z I
Z W I Z
I Z
Z W I
r
s k m
k q
m q l k
k
æ ö¢¢ ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷¢¢ç ÷ç ÷= ÷ç ÷ç ¢¢ ¢¢ ¶ ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø
K                              (S.17) 
where 
( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )
2 2
,
2 2
1 1
1 .
i Eve i i
i i i
F T W
F T W
k = - -
= -
                            (S.18) 
while 
( )( )( )2 21 ,iE i i iI F T Iwl x s= + -                           (S.19) 
and 
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )
2 2 2
22 2
1
1 ,
i i i i i
i i i i i i
F T F T
F T W F T W
wx s= -
+ - +
 
 
                    (S.20) 
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( )( ) 21 ,i i i iF Tm m¢¢ = - -                                    (S.21) 
where  
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )2 22 , ,i i Eve i i iW F T F Twm s= -                         (S.22) 
( )( ) 21 ,i i i iF Tq q¢¢= - -                                    (S.23) 
where 
( )( )( )( )2 21 1i i i iF T Wq = - - .                            (S.24) 
Without loss of generality, the conditional covariance matrices of Bob’s iB  and Eve’s iE  systems 
with respect to Alice’s Gaussian subcarrier variables ,i ix p  are precisely as follows: 
( )20, ,
i i i ix x p p ws¢ ¢= =K K K                                    (S.25) 
( )20, ,
i i i iE x E p ws= =K K K                                   (S.26) 
and 
( ), , , 0, 0i i i i i i ix p x p E x p¢ ¢ = =K K K .                                (S.27) 
The covariance matrices (S.25)–(S.27), the symplectic spectra for the single-carrier Gaussians will 
be constructed next.  
 
S.2.1  Homodyne Measurement, Reverse Reconciliation 
Specifically, the related covariance matrices of the recovered single-carrier Gaussians are 
( )
0
20, ,
j j j jx x p p ws¢ ¢= =K K K                                    (S.28) 
( )
0
20, .
j j j jE x E p ws= =K K K                                   (S.29) 
From the covariance matrices (S.28)–(S.29), the symplectic spectra are evaluated as follows. For 
each channel uses 1  and 2 , the condition ( )( ) 210 1i ill F T< <å   holds for the l Gaus-
sian sub-channels i  of 1 , 2 , and 
0
2 1ws   holds, the symplectic spectra ,j jx p¢ ¢   for Bob’s 
single-carrier Gaussian CV, jB , are precisely as follows: 
( )( ) ( )( )( )
0 02 1
2 22 21 1 1 1,
j jx p i i i il ll l
F T F Tw ws s¢ ¢ Ã Ã= = å å    ,          (S.30) 
where 
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( )( ) 211 2 i ill F TÃ Ã = å  ,                                    (S.31) 
( )( ) ( )( )( )
0 0
22 22 1 21 1 1, 1 ,
j j j jx x p p
i i i i il l ll l l
F T F T Ww wgs g s
¢ ¢
-
=
æ öæ ö ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷= -ç ÷÷ç ç ÷÷çç ÷è øè øå å å
 
       (S.32)                     
where  
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )2 22 2 21 1 11 2 .i i i i i il l ll l lF T F T F Tg æ ö÷ç ÷= + + -ç ÷ç ÷çè øå å å    (S.33) 
Without loss of generality, for Eve’s system, jE , the symplectic spectra jE  is precisely as fol-
lows: 
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
0 02 1
2 22 22 21 1 1 1 1 11 , 1 , ,
jE i i i i i il l l ll l l l
F T F T W Ww ws sW W
æ ö÷ç ÷= - -ç ÷ç ÷çè øå å å å   ,                     
(S.34) 
where 
( )( )( )2211 2 1 i ill F TWW = - å  .                                 (S.35) 
In particular, in case of reverse reconciliation, the symplectic spectra 
j jE x ¢  and j jE p¢  of jE  are 
evaluated precisely as follows: 
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
21 02
21 01
3 32 2 21 1 1 1 1
3 32 2 21 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 ,
1 1 , ,
,1
j j j j
i ill
i ill
E x E p
i i i i il l ll l lF T
i i i i il l ll l lF T
ill
F T F T W
F T F T W
W
w
w
s
s
¢ ¢


=
æ öæ ö ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷- +ç ÷÷ç ç ÷÷çç ÷è øåç ÷ç ÷÷ç æ ö ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷= - + ÷çç ÷ ÷çç ÷ç ÷è øåç ÷ç ÷ç ÷÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷÷çè ø
å å å
å å å
å


 
 
                      
(S.36) 
where  
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )21 3 32 21 1 1 11 2 1 1 .i ill i i i i il l ll l lF T F T F T W
æ ö÷ç ÷  = - +ç ÷ç ÷çè øå å å å     (S.37) 
Particularly, from the symplectic spectra of (S.30)–(S.34) and (S.36), the hom,RR Mtwo wayS -  asymptotic 
rate for the RR, homM , two-way AMQD modulation is expressed as follows: 
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( ) ( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( )
hom
22 21 1
221
1 1 1 1
,
1
1
22
1
1 1 1 1
2 22 2 2 2
: :
log
log log .
i i i il ll l
i ill
i i i il l l ll l l l
RR M
two way
F T F T
F T
W W W W
S I A B B Ec-
æ ö÷ç ÷ç - + ÷ç ÷÷çè ø
-
+ + - -
= -
å å
=
å
æ öå å å å ÷ç- - ÷ç ÷çè ø
 

                (S.38) 
■ 
S.2.2  Homodyne Measurement, Direct Reconciliation 
Without loss of generality, the covariance matrices of the recovered single-carrier Gaussians are 
( )
0
20, ,
j j j jx x p p ws¢ ¢= =K K K                                     (S.39) 
( )
0
20, .
j j j jE x E p ws= =K K K                                     (S.40) 
Specifically, using (S.39)–(S.40), the corresponding symplectic spectra of jB  and jE  are as shown 
in (S.30)–(S.34), while Eve’s symplectic spectra 
j j j jE x E p
=   in the direct reconciliation are 
evaluated precisely as follows: 
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
0 0
22 22 21 1 1 1 11 , 1 , ,1 ,
j j j jE x E p
i i i i i il l l ll l l l
F T F T W Ww ws s
=
æ öæ ö ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷= - -ç ÷÷ç ç ÷÷çç ÷è øè øå å å å
 
   
(S.41) 
where 
( )( ) ( )( )( )22 21 11 3 i i i il ll lF T F T= + +å å   .             (S.42) 
In particular, from the symplectic spectra of (S.30)–(S.34) and (S.41), the hom,DR Mtwo wayS -  asymptotic 
rate of the DR, homM , two-way AMQD modulation is 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )( )( )
hom
21 1 1 1 1
221
,
1 1 1 11
2 2 22 2 2 2 2
1
: :
log log log .i i i i i il l l l ll l l l l
i ill
DR M
two way
F T W W W W
F T
S A B A Ec c-
+ + - -
-
= -
æ öå å å å å ÷ç= - - ÷ç ÷çè øå


  (S.43) 
■ 
S.2.3  Heterodyne Measurement, Reverse Reconciliation 
Particularly, the covariance matrices of the recovered single-carrier Gaussians are 
( ), , , 0, 0j j i i j j jx p x p E x p¢ ¢ = =K K K .                                 (S.44) 
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The symplectic spectra ,
j jx p¢ ¢   have been evaluated in (S.30). On the other hand, in a hetero-
dyne measurement hetM , the symplectic spectra ,j jx p¢ ¢  of Bob’s system is precisely as follows: 
( )( )( )
0
22 21 1
, , 1 ,j j j j i i ix p x p l ll lF T Wws¢ ¢
ææ ö ö÷ ÷çç ÷ ÷= -çç ÷ ÷çç ÷ ÷ççèè ø øå å  .                (S.45) 
Eve’s symplectic spectra ,j j jE x p¢ ¢  is evaluated exactly as 
( )( )( )
0
22 21
1 2 3, , , , 1 ,j j j i iE x p ll F T ws¢ ¢
æ æ ö ö÷ ÷ç ç ÷ ÷= G G G -ç ç ÷ ÷ç ç ÷ ÷ç çè è ø øå                   (S.46) 
where  
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )( )
3 22 2 21 1 1 1 1
2 21 1
1 1 1 1
1 2 3
1
.
i i i i i i i il l l l ll l l l l
i i i il ll l
W F T F T F T W
F T F T
æ æ ö ö÷ ÷ç ç ÷ ÷ç ç+ + + - + ÷ ÷ç ç ÷ ÷÷ ÷ç çè è ø ø
+
å å å å å
G G G = å å
  
 
      (S.47) 
Without loss of generality, using the symplectic spectra of (S.34) and (S.45)-(S.46), the het,RR Mtwo wayS -  
asymptotic rate for the RR, hetM , two-way AMQD modulation is expressed as 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )
het
2 21 1
2 22 2 22 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
,
2 1
2
ˆ 1 1
1 1 1 1
2 22 2 2 2
1 1 1
2 22 2 2
: :
log
log log
2 log log
i i i il ll l
i i i i i i i il l l l ll l l l lE Aj j
i i i i
i i i il l l ll l l l
RR M
two way
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S.2.4  Heterodyne Measurement, Direct Reconciliation 
Specifically, the corresponding covariance matrices of the recovered single-carrier Gaussians are 
 ( ), , , 0, 0j j j j j j jx p x p E x p¢ ¢ = =K K K .                                  (S.49) 
Particularly, Eve’s corresponding symplectic spectra is ,j j jE x p , which is expressed as follows: 
( )( )( )
0
22 21 1
, 1 , ,1,1 .j j j i i iE x p l ll lF T Wws
ææ ö ö÷ ÷çç ÷ ÷= -çç ÷ ÷çç ÷ ÷ççèè ø øå å                  (S.50) 
Without loss of generality, from the symplectic spectra of (S.45)–(S.46) and (S.50), the het,DR Mtwo wayS -  
asymptotic rate for the RR, hetM , two-way AMQD modulation is expressed precisely as 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )( )( )
het
21 1 1 1 1
221
,
,hom
1 1 1 1
2 2 22 2 2 2
1
: :
2
2 : :
log 2 log log .i i i i i il l l l ll l l l l
i ill
DR M
two way
DR
two way
F T W W W W
F T
S A B A E
R
A B A E
c c
c c
-
-
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-
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=
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æ öå å å å å ÷ç= - - ÷ç ÷çè øå


  (S.51)                     
■ 
 
S.3  Notations 
The notations of the manuscript are summarized in Table S.1. 
 
Table S.1. The summary of the notations of the manuscript.  
 
Notation Description 
K  Correlation matrix. 
( )diag ⋅  Diagonal matrix. 
i Index for the i-th subcarrier Gaussian CV, ii i ix pf = + . 
j 
Index for the j-th Gaussian single-carrier CV, 
ij j jx pj = + . 
l 
Number of Gaussian sub-channels i  for the transmission 
of the Gaussian subcarriers. The overall number of the sub-
channels is n. The remaining n l-  sub-channels do not 
transmit valuable information. 
( ),i ix p  Position and momentum quadratures of the i-th Gaussian subcarrier, ii i ix pf = + . 
( ),i ix p¢ ¢  Noisy position and momentum quadratures of Bob’s i-th noisy subcarrier Gaussian CV, ii i ix pf¢ ¢ ¢= + . 
( ),j jx p  Position and momentum quadratures of the j-th Gaussian single-carrier ij j jx pj = + . 
( ),j jx p¢ ¢  Noisy position and momentum quadratures of Bob’s j-th recovered single-carrier Gaussian CV ij j jx pj¢ ¢ ¢= + . 
,A ix , ,A ip  
Alice’s quadratures in the transmission of the i-th subcar-
rier. 
,B ix , ,B ip  Bob’s quadratures in the transmission of the i-th subcarrier.
,E ix , ,E ip  Eve’s quadratures in the transmission of the i-th subcarrier.
Eve  Eve’s entangling cloner. 
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*SNRi  
Signal to noise ratio of the i-th Gaussian sub-channel i . 
Used for the evaluation of the private classical capacity 
( )iP  , expressed as 
2
2
*
*SNR i
i
i
ws
s=

, where 2
iws  is the 
modulation variance of the subcarrier quadratures, and 
*
2
i
s   is the noise variance.  
r  
Symplectic spectra of r , ( )1s , snr =  ,  where si -s are 
real elements. 
S  Superset. 
I   Identity matrix, ( )1,1I diag= . 
Z  Pauli Z matrix, ( )1, 1Z diag= - . 
( )S ⋅  
The von Neumann entropy function. For a Gaussian den-
sity r  it is expressed as ( ) ( )
1
s
n
i
i
S gr
=
= å , where 
( ) s 1 s 1 s 1 s 12 22 2 2 2s log logi i i iig + + - -= - , and the si -s are real 
elements of the symplectic spectra ( )1s , snr =  . 
2 2,i ix p  
Variances of Alice’s subcarrier quadratures, 
2 2 2
i
i ix p ws= = . 
2 2,i ix p¢ ¢  
Variances of Bob’s noisy subcarrier quadratures, 
( )( ) 22 2 2 2
i i
i i i ix p F T ws s¢ ¢= = +  . 
ix
e ¢  
Alice’s estimator on Bob’s noisy ix ¢  subcarrier quadrature 
from her ix  quadrature, evolved as ,i ix A x ie xe¢ = , where 
2, .
i i
i i
x x
A x x
e ¢¢ =  
ip
e ¢  
Alice’s estimator on Bob’s noisy ip¢  subcarrier quadrature 
from her ip , expressed as ,i ip A p ie pe¢ ¢= , where 
2, .
i i
i i
p p
A p p
e ¢¢ =  
ix
e ,
ip
e  Bob’s estimators on the quadratures of Alice’s i-th subcar-
rier. 
i
E
x
e ¢ , i
E
p
e ¢  
Eve’s estimators on the quadratures of Bob’s i-th subcarrier 
in the RR direction. 
i
E
x
e ,
i
E
p
e  Eve’s estimators on the quadratures of Alice’s i-th subcar-
rier in the DR direction. 
,E j
A
x
e ,
,E j
A
p
e  Alice’s estimators on the quadratures of Eve’s j-th single-
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carrier in the DR direction. 
,E j
B
x
e ,
,E j
B
p
e  Bob’s estimators on the quadratures of Eve’s j-th single-
carrier in the RR direction. 
2ˆ
i xi
x e
s
¢¢  
Conditional variance evaluated for the position subcarrier 
quadratures ,
ii x
x e ¢¢ , where ixe ¢  is Alice’s estimator on Bob’s 
noisy ix ¢  subcarrier quadrature from her ix , expressed as 
( ) 2222 2ˆ i iii x ii x xi x ix e xx e xs ¢
¢
¢¢ ¢ ¢= - = - . 
2ˆ
i pi
p e
s
¢¢  
Conditional variance evaluated for the momentum subcar-
rier quadratures ,
ii p
p e ¢¢ , where ipe ¢  is Alice’s estimator on 
Bob’s noisy ip ¢  subcarrier quadrature from her ip , ex-
pressed as ( ) 2222 2ˆ i iii p ii p pi p ip e pp e ps ¢
¢
¢¢ ¢ ¢= - = - . 
( ):x A Bc , ( ):p A Bc  Holevo quantities between Alice and Bob, evaluated with respect to the x and p quadratures. 
( ):x B Ec , ( ):p B Ec  Holevo quantities between Bob and Eve, evaluated with respect to the x and p quadratures. 
( ):x A Ec , ( ):p A Ec  Holevo quantities between Alice and Eve, evaluated with respect to the x and p quadratures. 
RR
xS ,
RR
pS  
Secret key rates for reverse reconciliation, with respect to 
the x and p quadratures. 
DR
xS ,
DR
pS  
Secret key rates for direct reconciliation, with respect to the 
x and p quadratures. 
2
i
s  
Noise variance of the Gaussian sub-channel i  for the 
characterization of classical rates and classical capacity 
( )iC  . 
*
2
i
s  
Noise variance of the Gaussian sub-channel i  for the 
characterization of private classical capacity ( )iP  , 
( )( )
( )( )
22 2
* 22 2
1
2 2
1
1
i ii i
ii i ii i
F T
F T
w
w
s s
w s s
s s C
C
-+
+
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= - ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø

 
, where 2 20 ,
i
iNs sC = +  
and 2s  is the vacuum noise. 
iN  
Excess noise of the Gaussian sub-channel i ,  
( ) ( )( )
( )
2
,
2
,
1
1
i Eve i
Eve i
W F T
i
F T
N
-
-
= , where ( ) ( )2 2, 1Eve i iF T F T= -  is 
Eve’s Fourier-transformed transmittance, while iW  is the 
variance of Eve’s i-th EPR state.  
( )iP   Private classical capacity of the Gaussian sub-channel i . 
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( )RR iP   Private classical capacity of the Gaussian sub-channel i  in a RR CVQKD protocol run. 
( )DR iP   Private classical capacity of the Gaussian sub-channel i  in a DR CVQKD protocol run. 
ix , ip  
Modulated quadratures, expressed as i i i ix x x x= +  , and 
i i i ip p p p= +  , where the variables ix   and ip  refer to 
the modulated position and momentum quadratures. 
2
ix
s , 2ips  
The modulation variances of subcarrier quadratures ix  and 
ip , expressed as ( )2 2 2 2 21 ,
i i i i i ix p x x p pws s s s s= = - + +     
where 2 2 1
i i i ix x p p
s s= =  , and 2 2 2i ix p ws s s= =  . 
s  
Squeezing factor, 1s =  for coherent states, constrained 
into the range of 
2
21
i
i
s
w ws
s< < . 
0N  Shot-noise variance. 
iW  
Variance of Eve’s EPR state, used in the attack of the i-th 
Gaussian sub-channel i . 
W  
Averaged (i.e., taken for a single-carrier Gaussian CV) 
value of Eve’s EPR state variances, 1 illW W= å . 
2ˆ
j jB A
s , 2ˆ
j jE A
s  
Averaged (i.e., taken for a single-carrier Gaussian CV) con-
ditional variances for Alice and Bob, and Alice and Eve, 
expressed as 2 21
1
ˆ
i ij j
l
B AB A l
i
s s
=
= å , 2 21
1
ˆ
i ij j
l
E AE A l
i
s s
=
= å . 
( )( )21 ,
1
l
Eve il
i
F T
=
å  
Eve's averaged Fourier-transformed transmittance parame-
ter, ( )( ) ( )( )2 21 1,
1 1
1
l l
Eve i i il l
i i
F T F T
= =
= -å å  . 
( )( ) 21
1
l
i il
i
F T
=
å   
Averaged Fourier-transformed transmittance parameter of 
 , ( )( ) ( )( )221 1 ,
1 1
1
l l
i i Eve il l
i i
F T F T
= =
= -å å . 
( ) 2,Eve iF T ¢  
Eve’s Fourier-transformed transmittance parameter in an 
SVD-assisted AMQD multicarrier setting, expressed as 
( ) ( )( )2 2, ,1 1 ,Eve i i Eve iF T F Tu¢ = - -  where 
( )( )( )
2 2
min
22
max
max
,
Eve i
n
Eve i i
i
i
F T
n s l
n s
u
"
æ ö÷ç ÷-ç ÷ç ÷è ø
-
= 
 
 ( ) ( )2 2, ,Eve i Eve iF T F T¢ < . 
2
ws ¢¢  
Virtual modulation variance of the subcarrier quadratures 
in an SVD-assisted AMQD multicarrier transmission, ex-
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pressed as ( )2 2 21 cw w ws s s¢¢ = + > , where 0c >  is a con-
stant. 
( )( ) 21 i il
l
F T ¢å   
Averaged Fourier-transformed transmittance parameter for 
the SVD-assisted multicarrier CVQKD transmission, evalu-
ated as ( )( ) ( )( )( )
2 2
min
22
max
21
max
.
Eve i
n
Eve i i
i
i il F Tl
F T
n s l
n s
"
æ ö÷ç ÷-ç ÷ç ÷è ø
-å

 
  
homM  Homodyne measurement. 
hetM  Heterodyne measurement. 
hom,RR M
one wayR -   
Secret key rate in one-way CVQKD, at homodyne meas-
urement and reverse reconciliation. 
het,RR M
one wayR -  
Secret key rate in one-way CVQKD, at heterodyne meas-
urement and reverse reconciliation. 
hom,RR M
two wayR -  
Secret key rate in two-way CVQKD, at homodyne meas-
urement and reverse reconciliation. 
het,RR M
two wayR -  
Secret key rate in two-way CVQKD, at heterodyne meas-
urement and reverse reconciliation. 
hom,DR M
one wayR -   
Secret key rate in one-way CVQKD, at homodyne meas-
urement and direct reconciliation. 
het,DR M
one wayR -  
Secret key rate in one-way CVQKD, at heterodyne meas-
urement and direct reconciliation. 
hom,DR M
two wayR -  
Secret key rate in two-way CVQKD, at homodyne meas-
urement and direct reconciliation. 
het,DR M
two wayR -  
Secret key rate in two-way CVQKD, at heterodyne meas-
urement and direct reconciliation. 
P  
The private classical capacity domain of  , 
( )
1 2
1 2
,
,
z z
z z
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷çè øP = P , where   refers to the convex hull 
of independent input distributions. 
1, , KP P  
Corner points of the private classical capacity region P  of 
K users, 1, ,KU  . 
1, KU U  K users in a multiuser CVQKD scenario. 
( )MQAI ⋅  
The corresponding correlation measure function between 
Alice and Bob, Bob and Eve, or Alice and Eve in AMQD-
MQA. It identifies a mutual information function or a 
Holevo quantity, depending on the direction of the recon-
ciliation scheme and the measurement attributes of the ac-
tual CVQKD protocol run. 
kE  Eve’s variable in the attack of user’s kU  transmission. 
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( )MQA : k
K
I y Eå  
Characterizes the eavesdropped information from the K 
users in a multiuser CVQKD scenario, quantified by the 
mutual information function or the Holevo information 
functions, depending on the CVQKD protocol. 
MQA
kS  The secret key rate of user kU . 
MQA
sumS  
The sum secret key rate of K users, characterizes the overall 
secret key rate of the users, MQA MQAsum kKS S= å . 
MQA
symS  
The symmetric secret key rate of K users, characterizes the 
common rate at which all K users can have a simultaneous 
reliable secret communication through  . 
( )sumP    The sum private classical capacity of  , characterizes the overall maximized secret key rate of the users. 
( )symP   
The symmetric private classical capacity of  , character-
izes the maximized common rate at which all K users can 
have a simultaneous reliable secret communication through 
 . 
( )sumS ¢   The sum secret key rate of K users in an SVD-assisted mul-ticarrier CVQKD setting.  
MQA
symS ¢  The symmetric secret key rate of K users in an SVD-assisted multicarrier CVQKD setting. 
( )sumP ¢   
The sum private classical capacity of  , characterizes the 
overall maximized secret key rate of the users in SVD-
assisted AMQD-MQA. 
( )symP ¢   
The symmetric private classical capacity of  , character-
izes the maximized common rate at which all K users can 
have a simultaneous reliable secret communication in SVD-
assisted AMQD-MQA. 
, .
,
RR coh
tol AMQDN  
The maximal tolerable excess noise in AMQD, for RR and 
coherent state transmission. 
, .
,
RR squ
tol AMQDN  
The maximal tolerable excess noise in AMQD, for RR and 
squeezed state transmission. 
,
,
RR one way
tol singleN
-  The maximal tolerable excess noise in single-carrier trans-
mission, for RR and one-way CVQKD. 
,
,
DR one way
tol singleN
-  The maximal tolerable excess noise in single-carrier trans-
mission, for DR and one-way CVQKD. 
,
,
DR one way
tol AMQDN
-  The maximal tolerable excess noise in AMQD, for DR and 
one-way CVQKD. 
,
,
RR one way
tol singleN
-  The maximal tolerable excess noise in AMQD, for RR and 
one-way CVQKD. 
,
SVD
tol AMQDN  The maximal tolerable excess noise in SVD-assisted AMQD.
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1 , 2  
Identifies the two channel uses of a two-way CVQKD pro-
tocol. First channel use, 1 , from Bob to Alice, the  sec-
ond one, 2 , from Alice to Bob.   
H  
Expressed as 
2
2
1 A
A
T
T
-H = , where 2AT  is the transmittance 
of Alice’s internal beam splitter used for the separation of 
the position and momentum quadratures. 
( )20, zz sÎ   
The variable of a single-carrier Gaussian  CV state, 
ij Î  . Zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian 
random variable, 
0
22 22z z ws s
é ù =ê úë û=  , with i.i.d. zero 
mean, Gaussian random quadrature components 
( )
0
2, 0,x p wsÎ  , where 0
2
ws  is the variance.  
( )20,sDD Î   
The noise variable of the Gaussian channel  , with i.i.d. 
zero-mean, Gaussian random noise components on the posi-
tion and momentum quadratures ( )2, 0,x p sD D Î   , 
222 2s sD é ù =ê úë û= D  . 
( )20, dd sÎ   
The variable of a Gaussian subcarrier CV state, if Î  . 
Zero-mean, circular symmetric Gaussian random variable, 
22 22d d ws sé ù =ê úë û=  , with i.i.d. zero mean, Gaussian ran-
dom quadrature components ( )2, 0,d dx p wsÎ  , where 2ws  
is the modulation variance of the Gaussian subcarrier CV 
state.  
( ) ( )1 †CVQFTF- ⋅ = ⋅  The inverse CVQFT transformation, applied by the en-
coder. Continuous-variable unitary operation. 
( ) ( )CVQFTF ⋅ = ⋅  The CVQFT transformation, applied by the decoder. Con-
tinuous-variable unitary operation. 
( ) ( )1 IFFTF- ⋅ = ⋅  Inverse FFT transform, applied by the encoder. 
0
2
ws  Single-carrier modulation variance. 
2 21
illw ws s= å  
Multicarrier modulation variance for the l Gaussian sub-
channels i . Determined as 2 minEvews n n= - , where 
1
Eve ln = , ( ) 2
22* *1
1 1
ik
n
n n
ki kn
F T T e
pl -= == = å å i  and 
*T  is the expected transmittance of the Gaussian sub-
channels under an optimal Gaussian collective attack. 
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( )
( )
,
1
,
IFFT
.
i k i
k i i
z
F z d
f
-
=
= =  
The i-th Gaussian subcarrier CV of user kU , where IFFT 
stands for the Inverse Fast Fourier Transform, if Î  , 
( )20,
i
i d
d sÎ  , 22
i
id
ds é ù= ê úë û , i ii d dd x p= + i , 
( )20,
i F
dx wsÎ  , ( )20,i Fdp wsÎ   are i.i.d. zero-mean 
Gaussian random quadrature components, and 2
Fws  is the 
variance of the Fourier transformed Gaussian state. 
( ), CVQFTk i ij f=  
The decoded single-carrier CV of user kU  from the subcar-
rier CV, expressed as ( ) ( )( )1 , , .i k i k iF d F F z z-= =  
  Gaussian quantum channel. 
, 1, ,i i n=   Gaussian sub-channels. 
( )T   
Channel transmittance, normalized complex random vari-
able, ( ) ( ) ( )Re ImT T T= + Î   i . The real part 
identifies the position quadrature transmission, the imagi-
nary part identifies the transmittance of the position quad-
rature. 
( )i iT   
Transmittance coefficient of Gaussian sub-channel i , 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )Re Imi i i i i iT T T= + Î   i , quantifies 
the position and momentum quadrature transmission, with 
(normalized) real and imaginary parts 
( )0 Re 1 2 ,i iT£ £  ( )0 Im 1 2i iT£ £ , where 
( ) ( )Re Imi i i iT T=  .  
EveT  Eve’s transmittance, ( )1EveT T= -  . 
,Eve iT  Eve’s transmittance for the i-th subcarrier CV. 
KÍ  
The subset of allocated users, KÍ . Only the allocated 
users can transmit information in a given (particularly the 
j-th) AMQD block. The cardinality of subset   is  . 
,  1, ,kU k =    An allocated user from subset KÍ . 
( )1, , Tdz z= + =z x p i  
An d-dimensional, zero-mean, circular symmetric complex 
random Gaussian vector that models d Gaussian CV input 
states, ( )0, zK , †é ùê úë û=zK zz , where i i iz x p= + i , 
( )1, , Tdx x=x  , ( )1, , Tdp p=p  , with ( )
0
20,ix wsÎ  , 
( )
0
20,ip wsÎ   i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian random variables. 
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( )1F-=d z  
An l-dimensional, zero-mean, circular symmetric complex 
random Gaussian vector of the l Gaussian subcarrier CVs, 
( )0, dK , †é ùê úë û=dK dd , ( )1, , Tld d=d  , i i id x p= + i , 
( )2, 0,
F
i ix p wsÎ   are i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian random 
variables, 
0
2 21
Fw ws s= . The i-th component is 
( )20,
i
i d
d sÎ  , 22
i
id
ds é ù= ê úë û . 
( )†0,k k kÎ é ùê úë ûy y y   A d-dimensional zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian random vector. 
,k my  
The m-th element of the k-th user’s vector ky , expressed as 
( )( ) ( ) ( ), .k m i i i ily F T F d F= + Då   
( )( )F T   Fourier transform of ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 , T ll lT Té ù= Îë ûT     , 
the complex transmittance vector. 
( )F D  Complex vector, expressed as ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 ,
TF FF
F e
- D DD
D =
K
 with 
covariance matrix ( ) ( ) ( )†F F FD = D Dé ùê úë ûK  . 
jé ùë ûy  AMQD block, ( )( ) ( ) ( )j F F j F jé ù é ù é ù= + Dë û ë û ë ûy T d . 
( ) 2F jt é ù= ë ûd  
An exponentially distributed variable, with density 
( ) ( ) 2221 2 ,nf e wt swt s -= 22n wt sé ù £ë û . 
,Eve iT  
Eve’s transmittance on the Gaussian sub-channel i , 
, , ,Re ImEve i Eve i Eve iT T T= + Î i , ,0 Re 1 2Eve iT£ £ , 
,0 Im 1 2Eve iT£ £ , 
2
,0 1Eve iT£ < . 
( )diffH x  Differential entropy of the continuous-variable x. 
( )diffH x y  Conditional differential entropy for input continuous-variable x, and output continuous-variable y.  
( )sumC   Sum capacity, the total throughput over the l sub-channels of   at a constant modulation variance 2ws . 
( )symC   
Symmetric capacity, the maximum common rate at which 
all users can reliably transmit information over the l sub-
channels of  . 
kR  Transmission rate of user kU . 
( )sumR   Sum rate, the total rate over the l sub-channels of   at a constant modulation variance 2ws . 
( )symR   Symmetric rate, the common rate at which all users can 
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reliably transmit information over the l sub-channels of  .
C  The   convex hull of independent input distributions. 
1, , KC C  Corner points of the capacity region C  of K users, 1, ,KU  . 
id  
A id  subcarrier in an AMQD block. For subset KÍ  
with   users and l Gaussian sub-channels, can be rewrit-
ten as 
2
1
1
, 1, ,
ik
n
i kkn
d z e i l
p-
== =å 
i
. 
minn  
The { }1min , , ln n  minimum of the in  sub-channel coeffi-
cients, where ( )( ) 22i i iF Tn s=    and i Even n< . 
 
 
 
S.4  Abbreviations 
 
AMQD   Adaptive Multicarrier Quadrature Division 
BS    Beam Splitter 
CV    Continuous-Variable 
CVQFT  Continuous-Variable Quantum Fourier Transform 
CVQKD   Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution 
DR   Direct Reconciliation 
DV   Discrete Variable 
FFT   Fast Fourier Transform 
HOM   Homodyne (measurement) 
HET   Heterodyne (measurement)  
IFFT   Inverse Fast Fourier Transform 
MQA    Multiuser Quadrature Allocation 
QKD   Quantum Key Distribution 
RR   Reverse Reconciliation 
SNR   Signal to Noise Ratio 
SVD   Singular Value Decomposition 
 
 
 
